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PREFACE
The essays in this book are based on lectures presented at Western Michigan 
University during the academic year, 1988-89. The occasion was the 25th an 
niversary of an annual lecture series under the direction of the faculty of the 
Department of Economics at Western Michigan University.
For each of the preceding 24 years, the Department had invited six 
distinguished economists to discuss a particular topic. These topics ranged from 
"Freedom and Capitalism" (1963-64) to "The Economics of Environmental 
Problems" (1971-72) to "The Economics of International Migration" 
(1984-85). In order to properly celebrate the 25-year milestone, it seemed fit 
ting to extend ourselves to examine the state of the entire discipline and to 
invite the most noted economists of our time those who have been awarded 
the Nobel Prize in Economics to do the examining.
There are a number of people to whom I am very grateful. First, to the Nobel 
Laureates who were willing to participate. Second, to my colleagues at the 
W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and especially to its direc 
tor, Robert Spiegelman, for generous support. Third, to my "bosses" at the 
University, including President Diether H. Haenicke (to whom this volume 
is dedicated), Provost George M. Dennison, and Deans A. Bruce Clarke and 
David O. Lyon. And finally, but certainly not least, to my colleagues in the 
Economics Department, especially my co-authors in another venture, Martin 
Bronfenbrenner (visiting professor) and Way land Gardner, who have taught 
me a great deal of macroeconomics, and Myron H. Ross and Raymond E. 
Zelder, who served on my committee.
Werner Sichel 
June 1989 
Kalamazoo, Michigan
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Introduction
Each year the President of the United States presents a "State of the 
Union" message. In it the President outlines accomplishments and 
challenges. While not completely analogous, we believe that the same 
approach, perhaps not on an annual basis, is appropriate with regard 
to a discipline. Economics is a particularly good candidate. It is a 
discipline very often maligned ("If you would lay economists end to 
end, they still wouldn't reach a conclusion.") yet simultaneously held 
in high esteem and accorded respect, as evidenced by how frequently 
economists are requested to advise government officials or business ex 
ecutives and how often they are sought for interviews on radio and TV 
and for writing opinion columns and editorials in newspapers and 
magazines.
What is the state of economic science as we begin the 1990s? Ob 
viously, this is a normative question. It involves a value judgment. Whom 
shall we ask? Many people have an opinion. But who can provide the 
most authoritative answers? We believe that the respondents must be 
professional economists practitioners rather than just observers. And 
who among economists? We suggest that they should be economists in
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that small select group who have been honored by being chosen to receive 
the top prize in economics Nobel Laureates in economics.
The Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics is a ''Johnny-come- 
lately." It was added nearly 70 years after the prizes in chemistry, 
literature, medicine or physiology, peace, and physics. The first one, 
shared by Ragnar Frisch of Norway and Jan Tinbergen of the 
Netherlands, was awarded in 1969. To date, only 26 economists have 
received the award. Fifteen of these were Americans. According to the 
rules established by the Central Bank of Sweden, the benefactor of the 
economics award, "The Prize shall be awarded annually to a person 
who has carried out a work in economic science of the eminent 
significance expressed in the Will of Alfred Nobel."
Having come to the conclusion that we wanted Nobel Laureate 
economists to present State of Economic Science messages, our next 
task was to attract six of them to do so. For pragmatic reasons, we limited 
our invitations to Americans. We were delighted with the results. Our 
invitations were graciously accepted by Kenneth J. Arrow, Robert M. 
Solow, Lawrence R. Klein, James Tobin, James M. Buchanan, and 
Herbert A. Simon. We believe they are an outstanding group, not only 
because of their eminence, but also because they provide a good represen 
tation of the spectrum of economic thought.
As most readers will correctly predict, the essays by Robert Solow, 
Lawrence Klein and James Tobin address the state of macroeconomics, 
while Kenneth Arrow, James Buchanan and Herbert Simon make more 
of an attempt to cover all of economics.
Kenneth J. Arrow, the recipient of the 1972 Nobel Prize in Economics, 
has for the past 35 years focused on and made major contributions to 
the theories of individual and social choice and general economic 
equilibrium. As the first speaker in the series and author of the first 
essay in this volume, he devotes some space to his perception of what 
economics is and does studying the relation between the individual 
and the system as it pertains to exchange and the transformation of 
resources and products.
Arrow enumerates what he considers to be the three most significant 
developments in economics during the last 50 years: (1) the greater
recognition of the importance of the time dimension in economic 
behavior; (2) the related appreciation of the need to study human behavior 
under conditions of uncertainty; and (3) the understanding that infor 
mation and knowledge are significant economic variables.
According to Arrow, economic science now recognizes that a dif 
ferent set of expectations (whether rational or not) about the future leads 
to a different present world, but he laments that as yet there are few 
markets established for future purchases and sales. Economic science 
has introduced uncertainty a consequence of being concerned about 
the future into its theories. This has strengthened the concept of ra 
tionality because it tells us more about the economic behavior of actors 
to whom economists assign probability distributions to possible out 
comes. Arrow, who defines "information" as any observation that 
changes a person's probability judgment, points out that economists must 
concern themselves with the consequences of informational inequalities.
Arrow sides with fellow Nobel Laureate, Herbert Simon (the final 
speaker in this series), in his admiration for the work of cognitive 
psychologists who have studied the abilities of humans to make rational 
choices. Arrow sees value for economics in their findings of systematic 
biases of a nonrational nature stemming from overconfidence, fram 
ing, and exaggerated response to information. He closes on the note 
that economic science, with the support of psychology and of computer 
science, faces the challenge of knowing better "how we come to ac 
quire knowledge and form beliefs and how we act and can act on that 
knowledge."
The second essay is by Robert M. Solow, a much more recent (1987) 
recipient of the Nobel Prize. He is best known for his development of 
the theoretical foundation as well as the empirical measurement and 
estimation of the effect of technological change on output.
Solow asserts that "macroeconomics is what it is all about" a view 
clearly shared by Klein and Tobin, whose essays follow. Solow pro 
vides an excellent historical review of macroeconomic thought, begin 
ning with pre-Keynes business cycle theory and ending with new-classical 
theory on the one hand and with what he calls new American-Keynesian 
theory on the other. In between, of course, came the contributions by
Keynes himself, as well as those by monetarists, expectationists, and 
supply-siders.
In Solow's view, the new-classical approach of "grounding 
macroeconomic models in complete individual-agent-based 
microeconomic theory . . . has been a blind alley in practice ..." with 
"no great empirical or predictive successes." Instead, he believes, 
economists ought to study the "macro foundations of microeconomics." 
(Buchanan the author of the fifth essay in this volume would take 
issue with that.) Solow finds that at least one group of new-Keynesians 
is making progress in this direction. This group places emphasis on im 
perfect competition, increasing returns to scale and trading externalities 
and concludes that the economy may be capable of many "self-sustaining 
equilibria" rather than just a single price-mediated market-clearing 
equilibrium. Solow sees macroeconomic science as in a state not yet 
fit for empirical application, but one where some economists are at least 
seeking to find the mechanisms that cause the economic system to 
malfunction. If they succeed, it may then be possible to formulate policies 
that would be beneficial. He opposes what he perceives to be the new- 
classical view that the market failures in question are "mere aberra 
tions" of the system. Solow maintains that they indeed are the system. 
What's wrong, Solow asks, with having a number of useful little models 
in the macroeconomist's arsenal and then choosing the relevant one for 
the particular condition that the economy is in? That is, of course, a 
rhetorical question. That is the sort of macroeconomic development to 
which he looks forward.
The third essay is written by Lawrence R. Klein, recipient of the 1980 
Nobel Prize. He is the founder of Wharton Econometric Forecasting 
Associates and has long been considered the chief architect of the large 
econometric forecasting model.
Klein discusses the state of economic science as it pertains to his 
specialty, macroeconometrics "the use of econometrics for the study 
of the macroeconomy." Klein's views concerning the history of 
macroeconomics the contributions made by the various schools of 
thought and what has worked and what has not differ little from those 
of Solow. Klein too recognizes Keynes as the great innovator, but admits
that the Keynesian model has benefited from later contributors who have 
helped beef up the supply side and the financial sector. Monetarism, 
in his view, has not passed the econometric test. And as concerns the 
new classical macroeconomics, he acknowledges that macro theory may 
be constructed as a system built upon an aggregation of microeconomic 
relationships, but insists that macro relationships have "a life of their 
own" and can be specified directly. Once they are, data can be applied, 
the system can be estimated, and it can be used for policy analysis.
Klein disapproves of what he sees as a trend toward using smaller  
more compact and simplified econometric models. Instead of using 
"the smallest system that is capable of explaining the facts of life," 
he favors using "the largest system that can be managed."
Klein acknowledges that forecasting is difficult, but contends that it 
cannot and should not be avoided. Reaction is too slow to be effective. 
He is somewhat optimistic that macroeconometric forecasting will 
improve but does not anticipate much help from those who rely on 
own-generated expectations. He sees the most promise in the use of 
"high-frequency" data to help adjust quarterly econometric models.
Klein ends his essay on the state of macroeconometrics on a mixed 
note. On the one hand, he is gratified to see some models, particularly 
the two-gap model, employed successfully in a number of centrally 
planned and/or developing economies. On the other hand, he sees no 
major breakthroughs "in the vast volume of research material that is 
being published" and finds that what is most popular with today's bright 
young scholars is really quite sterile.
The fourth essay is by James Tobin, recipient of the 1981 Nobel Prize 
in Economics. During the past 45 years, Tobin has focused on and made 
major contributions in the fields of macroeconomic theory, monetary 
theory and policy, portfolio theory, economic growth, and consumer 
behavior.
Tobin is very much in the same camp as Solow and Klein. He too 
is only interested in discussing the state of macroeconomics and con 
cludes that Keynes is really not vulnerable to the attacks by the new- 
classicals who appear to prefer to deal with a caricature of the Keyne 
sian theory of business fluctuations than with what Keynes actually pro 
fessed and wrote.
Tobin focuses on what he calls the fundamental issue in 
macroeconomics "the existence, reliability, strength, and speed of ad 
justments by which a market economy maintains or restores 
economy wide equilibrium" between the supply and demand for labor 
and what it produces. He explains that Keynes did not assume wage 
rigidity, but rather only that workers are concerned with relative wage 
parity. They very much resist nominal wage cuts, but are willing to 
accept real wage cuts in the form of price increases.
Furthermore, Tobin argues that contemporary "anti-Keynesian 'New- 
Classical' counterrevolutionaries" do not understand that even if wages 
and prices were flexible, there would still be unemployment in the 
presence of inadequate real demand. Flexible prices do not fully ab 
sorb demand shocks instantaneously.
Tobin is concerned that the new-classicals have made macroeconomics 
a "babble of parables" and that their stories in many respects do not 
resemble the real world. He considers microeconomics to be "a 
framework of analysis" rather than "a source of specific conclusions 
about the signs and magnitudes of relationships among economic 
variables." Tobin, perhaps more than any of the other contributors to 
this volume, observes a worrisome state of macroeconomic science: 
"There is a big gulf between academic macroeconomics and the 
macroeconomics oriented to contemporary events and policies."
The fifth essay in this volume is contributed by James M. Buchanan, 
the 1986 recipient of the Nobel Prize. He is the modern developer of 
the theory of public choice and has made major contributions to the 
development of the contractual and constitutional bases for the theory 
of political decisionmaking and public economics.
Buchanan's essay differs from all the others in this volume, but most 
especially from the three (Solow, Klein, Tobin) that precede it. Not 
only does Buchanan not address the state of macroeconomic science, 
he asserts that there is no place for macroeconomics, either as a part 
of positive or normative economics. He considers Keynesian-inspired 
macroeconomics to be a "monumental misdirection of scientific effort" 
since it largely ignores the structure of the economy. In many respects, 
Buchanan also disagrees with Arrow because Buchanan rejects the
commonly used methodology of maximizing objective functions sub 
ject to particular constraints. He believes that economists have been 
wasting their time focusing on scarcity, choice and value maximiza 
tion. Buchanan also does not share many of Simon's ideas, but there 
does appear to be one important commonality between the two both 
consider themselves "outsider" economists. In fact, one gets the im 
pression that they enjoy that status.
Buchanan characterizes himself as a methodological and normative 
individualist, a radical subjectivist, a contractarian, and a constitu 
tionalist. He views the economy as an order a constitutional order. 
Thus he sees voluntary exchange as mutually utility-enhancing, since 
it is based upon agreement between the parties engaged in the exchange. 
Furthermore, he contends that, as an order, the economy enables per 
formance to be evaluated in terms of results that are conceptually a part 
of the behavior of individuals acting within the order itself.
The state of economic science is not to Buchanan's liking. He would 
prefer to see economics (as a social science) concentrate on the topic 
of trade or exchange and the institutions that effect trade, such as con 
tracts and "the whole realm of collective agreement on the constitu 
tional rules of political society."
The final essay in this volume is contributed by Herbert A. Simon, 
who received the Nobel Prize in 1978. During the past 30 years he has 
focused on decisionmaking and problemsolving processes, using com 
puters to simulate human thinking.
Simon's essay deals with the state of the methodology employed in 
economic science. He perceives it to be in great need of reform and 
makes a number of important observations and concrete suggestions. 
Simon has no doubt about economics being a science. He believes that 
the profession's poor economic forecasting record is not an indication 
of its unscientific nature. He generalizes that one should be wary of 
using prediction as a test of science since an understanding of mechanisms 
does not guarantee predictability.
Simon observes that economists agree a great deal more than is ap 
parent to the general public. After all, most economists subscribe to 
a central core of theory, and even more important, to a way of reasoning
about economic questions. The problem, he suggests, is that economists 
disagree about "auxiliary assumptions" concerning matters such as what 
information people have and how they deal with uncertainty. Simon 
strongly counsels that economists need to vigorously test their auxiliary 
hypotheses. He warns against "theory without measurement," and urges 
economists to grub for facts, to worry less about predictability and more 
about whether their assumptions are correct (a view opposite to that 
presented by fellow Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman in his well-known 
1953 essay, "The Methodology of Positive Economics"), and to work 
with less aggregated data so that there is a better fit between theory 
and data.
As noted earlier in this introduction, Simon and Arrow both contend 
that economists should pay closer attention to the work done by cognitive 
psychologists who have developed both (1) a large body of empirically 
tested theory about decisionmaking and problemsolving, and (2) some 
techniques that use computers to simulate complex human thought 
processes.
Simon recommends that economists conduct more laboratory ex 
periments and field studies and, in that context, learn how to obtain 
data about beliefs, attitudes and expectations. He is fairly confident that 
the reform he calls for will be forthcoming since "the inability of 
economics today to play the policy role to which it aspires is a major 
source of pressure toward reform."
In this introduction we have attempted to provide the reader with 
"coming attractions" that whet the appetite. Each of the six essays that 
follow deserves careful reading. While brief, this collection is packed 
with ideas and insights accumulated over many years by six of the most 
outstanding twentieth century scholars in economic science.
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Dr. Kenneth J. Arrow
Joan Kenney Professor of Economics
and Professor of Operations Research 
Stanford University
Recipient of the 1972 Nobel Prize in Economics
In the context of a modern economy, economic science tries to ex 
plain what and how much all of us buy and sell, what prices we pay 
and receive, and the effects of taxes and expenditures by the govern 
ment. These few words contain a tremendous variety of activities and 
phenomena. We humans buy and sell not only chickens, which yield 
immediate satisfaction, but also factories and machines, which yield 
outputs and revenues in the future. We buy and sell such sophisticated 
commodities as securities, i.e., bonds and stocks. These are obligations 
to pay and receive amounts of money (itself a stage removed from goods 
in a simple sense) at points in the future and, in the case of stocks, the 
amounts are not even prescribed but depend on future events and deci 
sions not completely predictable at the time of the securities transfer. 
The prices we receive or pay include such abstractions as a rate of 
interest.
This is a very incomplete survey of the subject matter that economics 
seeks to explain. Economics is the attempt to systematize all these 
phenomena, to find underlying regularities and patterns in the relations 
among the prices and quantities it studies. It seeks to understand the 
basic motives that guide the economic agents in their decisions, and 
it tries to draw the implications of these motives for the evolution of 
prices and quantities. It is fair to say that economics was given its
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present orientation by Adam Smith, whose book, An Enquiry Concern 
ing the Wealth of Nations, was published in 1776 a date otherwise of 
considerable significance. It was his great insight that there is a mutual 
interaction between the workings of the economic system and the ac 
tions of every individual. The overall magnitudes, totals sold and bought, 
prices paid and received, are the result of the actions of individuals, 
but in turn the system magnitudes control the actions of individuals. 
Even though everyone is trying to act to his or her own benefit, the 
results may correspond to no one's intent. For example, a firm will 
seek to maximize its profits (that is, make them as large as possible) 
taking as given the prices it pays for inputs and receives for outputs. 
But competition among many firms, each maximizing profits, results 
in minimum profits. The elaboration of the interconnectedness of the 
economy and the reciprocity between the system and the individual has 
been a fine example of international scientific intercourse over more 
than two centuries, as what the Scotsman Smith introduced was further 
developed by the Frenchman, Leon Walras, and the Italian, Vilfredo 
Pareto.
The economic system performs several functions, but the one that 
is most stressed by modern economists is the allocation of resources. 
Goods flow from place to place. They start from farm or mine through 
various stages of transformation to end in the hands of their ultimate 
consumers. Where and to whom they go and what processes are per 
formed are the result of myriad individual economic decisions all pro 
foundly influenced by the conditions of the market. Goods will not be 
produced if the prices received do not cover the costs of production 
or if there is no one who will buy them.
What is remarkable about the process by which the market system 
allocates resources is that it requires surprisingly little knowledge of 
the entire system by any one individual. The seller need only know there 
is a buyer willing to pay a suitable price and does not need to know 
(and usually does not know) why the buyer wants the product, whether 
to resell or to use in further production. This economy of vision is not 
merely the product of a modern complex society. In Athens of the 5th 
century B.C., Herodotus, the "Father of History" and certainly an 
unusually well-informed man of his day, did not know the ultimate source
13
of the tin which the Greeks imported to make bronze. All he knew was 
that the Greek settlers in what is now Marseilles bought tin from mer 
chants who brought it down the Rhone. We know now that it ultimate 
ly came from Britain, a land whose very existence had only legendary 
meaning to Herodotus.
As economists see it, the chief coordinating instruments are prices. 
A price is an incentive to sellers or producers and a penalty to buyers. 
If there is a serious imbalance between supply and demand, prices rise 
or fall to bring the two into balance. Thus, if there is more supply than 
demand at a given price, competition among sellers brings prices down, 
both reducing supply and increasing demand. An equilibrium is a set 
of prices for which the corresponding inducements to sellers and buyers 
lead to equality of supply and demand on each market. The price system 
explains the limited need for knowledge by any one participant; it is 
necessary to know only the prices of the commodities in which he or 
she deals.
Economists differ as to the degree to which equilibria are actually 
attained. Some argue that the economy is very nearly in equilibrium 
all of the time; others, like myself, point to recurrent unemployment 
and to the nonexistence of markets for future sale and delivery as serious 
deficiencies in the equilibrium account of the economic world. But all 
agree that the tendencies toward equilibrium are real and important.
With this sketch of what economics is all about, let me turn to what 
I regard as the most significant and indeed dramatic developments of 
the last 50 years: the fuller and deeper exploration of the time dimen 
sion in economic behavior, the importance of uncertainty, and the 
recognition of information and knowledge as significant economic 
variables. These are interrelated developments, as we shall see.
Exchange and transformation of goods are the key economic 
phenomena, as has been emphasized. But these can occur not only over 
space or across industries but also over time. Individuals live for ex 
tended periods of time. They have concern, not only for their own futures 
but for their children and others beyond their own lifetime. Production 
takes time. The farmer plants first and harvests only after a period of 
time. Factory production also takes time. The production of a given 
commodity is not only a time-consuming process but also requires the
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use of instruments, whether machines or buildings, which wear out only 
gradually and over very long periods of time. Inventories are essential 
for the smooth running of production and have to be held for some period 
of time, though usually brief. Wine must be held for several years to 
achieve its full potential, and the greater the wine the more it will im 
prove with age. Electric power generating plants have effective lifetimes 
of 30 years and more; dams for power or for irrigation may be useful 
for a century.
The choices of the amounts and durabilities of investment projects 
are based on two values. One is the individual desire to protect oneself 
for the future, that is, to save; the other is the usefulness of investment 
in creating new valuable products in the more or less distant future. 
The saver will use the money not expended on current consumption 
to purchase bonds or stocks, whose sale finances investment. More fun 
damentally, we can see that for the economy as a whole the resources 
diverted from consumption by the individuals' desire to save are made 
available for investment.
How are these desires on the parts of different sectors of the economy 
coordinated or, in technical language, brought into equilibrium? There 
are now two periods in which transactions must take place, in the pres 
ent and in the future, when the product resulting from the investment 
becomes available. Today we have current markets for bonds or 
securities or other instruments of saving, and these operate like other 
markets. There are prices for these securities; in the case of bonds, the 
price effectively determines the rate of interest. But in the future, there 
is no such simple step. The product to be produced has to find a market. 
But there is not today any market for future sales and purchases of goods, 
with some few exceptions, and therefore no prices for them.
The profitability of an investment, therefore, can never be calculated 
from market data at the time of investment. Future prices are "expected" 
or "anticipated." We move from the concrete world of markets and 
market prices to a less solid realm of expectation. Now forming expec 
tations and acting on them are surely among the most characteristic of 
human actions. Shakespeare put this observation in the mouth of that 
most reflective character Hamlet: "Sure, he that made us with such 
large discourse,/ Looking before and after, gave us not/ That capabili-
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ty and god-like reason/ To fust in us unused." (Hamlet, Act IV, Scene 
4). It is not only future prices that one must look "before"; more general 
ly, the future conditions under which production and consumption will 
take place must be anticipated, for they are not currently known. Family 
size, market conditions, innovations whether to facilitate one's produc 
tivity or to create competitors, and weather conditions are among the 
innumerable conditions which will shape our decisions tomorrow and 
which therefore affect today's decisions to save or to invest.
The image or expectation of the future, therefore, shapes the pre 
sent. What we expect for the future will affect the amount we wish to 
save and how we distribute that amount among alternative ways of sav 
ing. What we expect for the future will also determine the directions 
in which we plan investments and therefore take at least the first steps 
to embody our plans in concrete and metal. But these decisions have 
concrete effects today. A high willingness to save reduces current con 
sumption. It may cause workers, therefore, to shift from consumption 
goods industries to investment goods industries, from garments to con 
struction. Workers may have to shift geographically to implement the 
interindustrial shift. A different set of expectations about the future leads 
to a different present world.
To digress for a minute, the principle here goes beyond economics. 
Images of future peace or war determine our present armaments and 
military preparations and may indeed lead to war or peace now. Ex 
pectations of good or bad future lives can influence our present attitude 
towards life, towards having children, towards developing or not 
developing social and cultural skills.
The elaboration of this picture of the economic world, in which the 
anticipations of the future affect the present and, of course, our present 
actions in investment and savings, help to determine the future, which 
I take to be perhaps the leading development in economic theory and 
analysis in the last 50 or 60 years. Let me mention by name the great 
pioneers of the 1930s, Ragnar Frisch, of Norway, and John R. Hicks, 
who died at the time these words were being written. These names are 
not household words like John Maynard Keynes, yet I would hold that 
their works are even today more influential in the practice of economics. 
Subsequent elaboration has resulted in an increasingly sophisticated set
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of models of economic action over time, followed by empirical im 
plementation of at least certain aspects, most noticeably in the securities 
markets, to which I will return a bit later.
I have emphasized the future, but the future always brings uncertain 
ty. Perhaps the greatest intellectual step of all in our understanding of 
the role of time in economics has been the explicit recognition of uncer 
tainty as an economic fact and as a factor recognized by individuals 
in their market behavior. Investors and savers alike are aware of the 
universality of uncertainty. They are uncertain about future prices, about 
future technology, about future preferences for goods.
Yet it is only after 1947 that economists and decision analysts 
developed explicit methods for assisting individuals, firms and govern 
ments in making decisions under uncertainty and to study the equilibrium 
configuration of the economy when agents are uncertain about the future 
and know they are uncertain. The study of this topic has transformed 
the content of economics, more perhaps than might be expected on first 
consideration.
The study of human behavior under uncertainty deepened and inten 
sified our understanding of one of the basic and most enduring themes 
in economic analysis, the notion of rationality. Implicitly in Adam Smith, 
explicitly in the economic theorists of the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century who in many ways set the basic structure of modern economics, 
the actors in the economy are considered to be rational beings in their 
choices.
First of all, firms are supposed to be rational in the sense that they 
seek, successfully, to maximize their profits under the conditions they 
face. This implies, for example, that each firm chooses methods of pro 
duction that make as small as possible the cost of production of whatever 
amount is produced and produces that quantity which will yield the 
largest profit possible, that is, the excess of revenue over cost is max 
imized. Rationality is identified with maximization; a rational firm will 
not rest content with one level of profits if by changing either its methods 
of production or its quantity produced it can make higher profits. Sec 
ond, each consumer or household is assumed to choose the quantities 
of the different goods consumed (and amount of labor supplied) so as
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to maximize some measure of the satisfaction the consumer receives, 
given the prices the household faces and the income it has.
These have been the traditional criteria for economic rationality. Under 
conditions of uncertainty, however, the concept of rationality becomes 
stronger, that is, says more about the behavior of economic actors. It 
is required that there be consistency among choices made under dif 
ferent conditions of uncertainty. To state in detail these criteria and their 
justification would take more space than is deserved here; but they can 
be made very persuasive indeed. They lead to the following standard 
formulation: We do not know which of several different possible out 
comes will occur, but we can assign probabilities to each possible out 
come. The actions taken by firms and households are like bets, in that 
the outcome of any such action (investment, act of saving) depends both 
on the action taken and the outcome in fact realized (e.g., which horse 
will win in a racetrack bet, what future product prices will be). In this 
language, I give one example of a rationality assumption: If you are 
willing to bet on an event, and the odds change in your favor, you are 
still willing to make the bet.
Earlier, when discussing the way resources are allocated over time, 
I stressed the importance of expectations of future prices. When uncer 
tainty is recognized, the concept of expectations is broadened. There 
is no single price expected; the investor or saver is uncertain about future 
prices and knows he or she is uncertain. Economic actors hold pro 
bability distributions of future prices for each commodity and each time 
period in the future. Put a slightly different way, there is a set of con 
tingent prices, one for each commodity in each time period under each 
of the possible states of affairs that may prevail between now and the 
time in question. For example, we might have a price for wheat next 
year contingent on the weather that prevails in the intervening period. 
Actually, in fuller detail, we should have a price for wheat next year 
contingent on the weather, demand conditions here and in foreign coun 
tries, technological innovations in the milling industry, new informa 
tion about the health implications of bread and of rival commodities, 
and so forth. Each contingent price is a well- defined number, but the 
contingencies themselves are uncertain. Each actor in the economy 
assigns probabilities to the alternative possible contingencies.
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Let us suppose that these contingent prices and the probabilities at 
tached to the contingencies are rationally developed by the participants 
in the economy. Then, if all the relevant information is publicly known, 
all individuals will have the same probability judgments. This theory 
may seem very general, but in fact it has striking implications for the 
pricing of securities. Namely, on the best available information, the 
average change will be zero (corrected for dividend payments). That 
is, the price of the security tomorrow is not known today. All investors 
assign the same probabilities to the different possible values of tomor 
row's price. Then the average of these different possible values, 
calculated using these probabilities, must be today's price. The reason 
for this conclusion is that if it were not so, if there were some predic 
table tendency for the price to rise from today to tomorrow on the 
average, then buyers would bid up the price of the stock today and so 
remove the profit opportunity.
This exposition contains in a nutshell what has come to be known 
as the "rational expectations" theory of the movement of prices and 
quantities over time. No doubt there is a slightly absurd aspect in assign 
ing complete rationality and complete foresight within the limits of in- 
eliminable uncertainty, a point illustrated by a parable widely repeated 
among economists: Two economists are walking down the street. One 
says, "Look, there's a $20 bill lying on the street," to which the other 
replies, "There can't be; if there were, someone else would have already 
picked it up." Nevertheless, the hypothesis that securities price changes 
are unpredictable from current prices has been subject to a good deal 
of empirical test. Many studies have confirmed the hypothesis very well; 
others have found minor variations.
Recognizing the importance of uncertainty in forward-looking 
economic behavior has led to another crucial extension of our perspec 
tives, understanding information as an economic variable. Information 
can be looked at broadly as any observation which changes one's pro 
bability judgments. Up to this point, I have made explicitly the assump 
tion that all information is public, that it is freely available to all in 
dividuals equally. In fact, of course, different agents have different in 
formation. Certainly, each firm, for example, knows its own produc 
tion possibilities better than other firms and better than possible investors;
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similarly, consumers know their own future needs better than others 
and particularly better than potential lenders to them. In a complex world 
with much more knowledge than any one individual can have, knowledge 
is specialized. Indeed, increasingly what workers of all kinds are sell 
ing is knowledge of a kind that others do not have; physicians, lawyers, 
and professors are no doubt extreme examples of what is, however, 
a very widespread characteristic. But such a world is one in which dif 
ferences in information not only exist but are the very reason for the 
existence of economic transactions.
There are many implications of this new viewpoint. One is that prices, 
particularly of securities or other assets, themselves convey informa 
tion, for they reveal something of what other people know. If one in 
vestor sees a rise in the price of a security for no reason known to him, 
it might at first be concluded that he or she will sell. In fact, the in 
vestor might be better off to infer that someone else has received 
favorable news and acted on that and therefore to conclude that the securi 
ty is worth more than originally thought.
There are many other implications of differing information among 
economic agents. In a transaction between a less and a more informed 
person, the former cannot be sure the latter is using the information 
available in the former's interest. This leads to provisions in contracts 
and in the nature of industrial organization which depart considerably 
from the simple model of buying and selling services and goods at fix 
ed prices. The new analysis has explained the many complex systems 
of rewards and long-term contractual relations as responses to the 
possibility of exploitation of special informational inequalities.
I have given to this point a fairly glowing picture of the success of 
economic theory in grasping more realistically many aspects of the 
economic relations among individuals: transactions over time, the 
presence of uncertainty, and the existence of private and uncommunicated 
information. I must add a sense of caution and limits to the ac 
complishments, not only about the state of theory but even at the level 
of fully understanding what the questions are.
It has in fact been a long-standing complaint against standard economic 
theory that it depends too much on the assumption of rationality. The 
complaint was raised by Thorstein Veblen, a famous dissenting
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economist at the turn of the century, against a theory of rational behavior 
in circumstances much less complex than those now studied, a world 
of certainty and predictability. Economic agents do not and indeed cannot 
perform all the calculations demanded by the theory. To anticipate prices 
rationally, they have in effect to understand a correct model of the 
economy and use it to project future prices or, more precisely, what 
future prices would be under a great variety of possible contingencies. 
The impossibility of carrying out such calculations is manifest from 
everyday observation and confirmed by the inability of economists us 
ing our theory and our computing power to make good forecasts (even 
good contingent forecasts). The theory of computation shows that the 
necessary computations have a high degree of complexity.
In recent years, cognitive psychologists have studied the abilities of 
humans to make rational choices and form probability judgments ra 
tionally in experimental situations far less complex than the real 
economy. Not only are the assumptions of rational behavior strongly 
contradicted, but systematic kinds of bias are found. Two are of special 
interest because of their potential implications for economics. One is 
a tendency to overconfidence. People usually rate their own abilities 
above average; obviously, this cannot be true of half of them. Thus, 
the buyer of a security is not so likely to ask himself or herself what 
the seller knows that motivates the sale; the buyer simply assumes his 
or her superiority of understanding. A second is that choices that are 
objectively the same are looked at differently according to the context, 
a phenomenon known as "framing." The same outcome can usually 
be thought of as a loss or a gain, depending on what the outcome is 
being compared to. For example, a profit on the sale of a stock could 
be thought of as a gain compared to the purchase price and a loss com 
pared with what was expected or what could have been made in an alter 
native investment. Rational behavior implies that these comparisons are 
irrelevant to a decision to sell the stock. But a considerable body of 
both experimental and field evidence in psychology implies that action 
does indeed depend on framing the decision as a gain or a loss.
There are many phenomena observed in the market which can be in 
terpreted to confirm lack of rationality. These are best drawn from the 
securities markets, not so much because they are central to the economy
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but because they can be far better observed than other economic 
phenomena, such as investments in plant and equipment. There is con 
siderable evidence that stock and bond prices fluctuate far more than 
is consistent with rational behavior on the part of the participants. The 
theory would imply that the current price of a security is the present 
value of its future returns averaged over all contingencies. Then the 
price should change only as the probabilities of different contingencies 
change in response to new information. But important new informa 
tion is rare. The price of a given stock frequently changes by 5 percent 
in a single day with no significant news about its prospects. This undue 
response to small changes conforms to some generalizations found ex 
perimentally by cognitive psychologists.
Another observation is the large volume of transactions on organiz 
ed markets. The assumptions of rational behavior, including rationali 
ty in deducing changes in the information of others from changes in 
market prices, would imply that no transactions would take place simply 
because of some change in the private information of some individual, 
although the price would alter. Transactions would be motivated by hedg 
ing or changes in other circumstances of the individual (aging or other 
changes in wealth or need prospects). For example, on the foreign ex 
change markets, a purchase or sale would be rational as an accompani 
ment to a sale or purchase abroad, to hedge against changes in the value 
of the payment. Hence the volume of transactions would be at most 
equal to the volume of foreign trade. In fact, the transaction volume 
is hundreds of times greater.
What can we conclude? The image of the future, cloudy though it 
be, powerfully influences the current state of the economic world (and 
indeed the social and political world). The formation of this image owes 
something indeed to our individual and collective efforts to use our ex 
perience and our preconceptions to that end. We are not without sense 
and reason, but we are subject to the necessity of oversimplification 
and to biases built into us. We can effectively use only part of the 
knowledge that is or could be available to us. But even if we used all 
we could, our prevision would be deficient because so much can hap 
pen that will necessarily be a total surprise.
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An important task of economic analysis today, in conjunction with 
recent work in psychology and in computer science, is to know better 
how we come to acquire knowledge and form beliefs and how we act 
and can act on that knowledge.
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A Nobel prize rather like James Bond's 007 appears to be a license 
to have an opinion about anything. But economics was founded by Adam 
Smith on the rock of the Division of Labor, and specialization is the 
name of the game. So I am going to specialize on the state of 
macroeconomics, mostly theoretical but with a few glances at applica 
tions. Distinguished and clever economists have been heard to remark 
knowingly that they understand microeconomics perfectly well and know 
what they think about this or that, but do not understand macroeconomics 
at all and find it a mystery. I have no patience with that ploy. 
Macroeconomics is what it is all about. If you do not understand the 
business cycle, unemployment, inflation, the real exchange rate, well, 
you do not understand economics at all. Microeconomics is easier, of 
course; it does not set itself such hard problems or aim at passing such 
hard tests.
My goal is to describe the current state of macro theory and to reflect 
on how it got there, its relevance for practical policy, and its possible 
evolution. I would like eventually to reach some understanding of why 
there is so much disagreement in public on what appear to be fundamental 
issues, with equally able and eminent economists taking contradictory 
positions. This situation gives rise to rude jokes and it explains, no doubt, 
the occasional coy attempt to dissociate oneself from the whole
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embarrassing exhibition. In considering these questions I am not going 
to try always to be judicious. That would be dull for all of us. I have 
strong prejudices on these matters and I will express them freely, prob 
ably sounding less tentative than I feel.
Debates about the fundamentals of macroeconomics usually struc 
ture themselves as arguments for and against "Keynesian economics." 
One reason for this formulation is that macroeconomics as we know 
it really begins with Keynes and the General Theory. Before that there 
was "Business Cycle Theory." Economists, like other people, observed 
that there was some alternation of good times and bad times. The ques 
tion arose, then: Why does it happen just that way? Business cycle theory 
looked for behavior patterns and market mechanisms that could be shown 
to be capable of generating and propagating cyclical fluctuations in the 
whole economy. They found plenty. Some of them were interesting, 
and remain interesting, just as economics is. The business cycle theory 
that I learned and taught did not quite amount to macroeconomics, 
however. It lacked a comprehensive theory of the determination of the 
level of economic activity, a theory of "output as a whole" as Keynes 
later called it. This is not a merely aesthetic complaint either. As the 
Great Depression of the 1930s showed, a model of regular repetitive 
cycles is not an adequate representation of the aggregate economy. 
Things happen that do not lie comfortably in that sort of model.
So macroeconomics in the modern sense really dates from the General 
Theory and that is one reason why it remains the focus of so much con 
temporary argument. The people who wrote the first reviews were my 
teachers, and some of them are still functioning today. There is an ad 
ditional reason: it was a provocative book, an intentionally provocative 
book, and it still provokes. It was also an undigested book, in the sense 
that it contained several distinct story lines. These are not well integrated 
with one another and indeed they are not always compatible with one 
another. This protean character makes it a good subject for debate, not 
only with its enemies but also among its avowed friends.
Eventually, maybe by some process of natural selection, an Authorized 
Version evolved. It is sometimes described as "American Keyne- 
sianism," although two of its main sources were famous articles by 
John Hicks and Franco Modigliani. The main components of this stan-
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dard model were and are an aggregate demand side derived from some 
version of IS-LM, and a theory of the price level, sometimes anchored 
in a given, inflexible, nominal wage, but not always. In practice, this 
model has been used with the presumption that most of the time the 
economy is operating below its potential for employment and output, 
with the realized levels of employment and output determined mainly 
by the demand side. For a long time the implicit belief was that the 
demand side is more volatile than the supply side. That may once have 
been a valid induction from history. More recent events have taught 
a contrary lesson. Nowadays supply shocks get at least equal billing, 
and movements of the price level and/or changes in the rate of infla 
tion, and expectations about those things, play a more prominent role 
than they used to. There is no need for me to provide any detail, because 
you will recognize that I have described the model that is embalmed 
in most elementary and intermediate textbooks of macroeconomics, and 
embodied in the big complete econometric models.
The original controversy between monetarism and Keynesianism was 
carried on within this framework. There were really two separate issues. 
One was quite specific: it had to do with the nature of the demand for 
money, especially its interest-elasticity. Within the model, this boils 
down to questions about the shape and stability of the LM-curve. The 
second issue was considerably broader; it had to do with the strength 
of the forces pulling the aggregate economy back toward its potential 
for output and employment after a disturbance. Within the model, this 
boils down to questions about the flexibility of wages and prices and 
their relation to employment and output. These issues are separate in 
the sense that the answer to one does not determine the answer to the 
other. But they are related: the first has to do with the way a monetary 
shock sorts itself out between velocity and nominal demand and the sec 
ond with the way a shock to nominal demand sorts itself out between 
output and the price level.
There was, of course, an argument about policy lurking behind the 
analytical issues. One side believed that steady growth of the money 
supply (or the monetary base) was the best and only necessary 
macroeconomic policy; the other believed that activist fiscal and 
monetary policy could improve macroeconomic performance. It is hard
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to shake the notion that there was an ideological fire behind all that 
intellectual energy. I suggested that the two analytical issues were in 
principle separate. So there are four possible positions one could take, 
but only two of the four boxes were ever seriously occupied.
In the past 10 or 15 years, macroeconomic theory has revolved around 
a slightly different axis, though the genealogy is pretty clear. Monetarism 
evolved into "new-classical" macroeconomics and American Keyne- 
sianism into something for which I have no catchy nickname. As is so 
often the case with macroeconomics, theoretical developments have both 
external and internal roots. They are in part a response to events out 
there in the real economy, and in part a response to gaps and anomalies 
that show up in the working-out of the theory itself.
The main external event was the inflation of the 1970s. I think of 
it as having been set off by OPEC and raw-material inflation general 
ly. Others, especially from the new-classical school, would regard that 
attribution as a typically shoddy piece of Keynesian ad hockery. It is 
not my job right now to analyze that inflationary episode. I am discuss 
ing the recent evolution of macroeconomic thought. From that point 
of view, what was important about the post-OPEC inflation was the 
appearance of a major sudden economic impulse that did not originate 
on the side of aggregate demand. For that reason alone there was no 
ready analysis from the Keynesian consensus. The embarrassment was 
compounded by the sharp role played by inflationary expectations, begin 
ning with the late phases of the Vietnam War, especially expectations 
about future public policy and its consequences.
Neither development, neither supply shocks nor inflationary expec 
tations, is incompatible with Keynesian macroeconomics. Contemporary 
textbooks like those of Dornbusch and Fischer and Gordon handle them 
as a matter of course, within a framework that is recognizably American- 
Key nesian. But the consensus was caught napping, to put it mildly. It 
took a while to recover. In the meanwhile, and even afterwards, the 
Keynesian consensus discovered that it had no adequate policy tools 
for meeting a supply-side-induced inflation compounded by entrench 
ed inflationary expectations. That is perhaps not the fault of the theory; 
no one else has a good policy answer either. But there is at best cold 
comfort in that excuse. We had allowed ourselves to become too
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optimistic about the tightness of our analysis and our capacity to guide 
the economy. The grip of the consensus was weakened.
The internal impulse that triggered and reinforced the new- classical 
movement was quite different. It was the conviction that macroeconomic 
theory ought to have "microeconomic foundations." I think that this 
conception has been subtly misread, however. So far as I can see, 
macroeconomic arguments have always been justified by an appeal to 
microeconomic convention or knowledge. Just think of the way the con 
sumption function and its variations are expounded in textbooks, or the 
way everyone introduces the chapter on the aggregate investment func 
tion by explaining the maximization of present value. The new school 
insisted on something much more formal, the grounding of macro- 
economic models in complete individual-agent-based microeconomic 
theory. That demand certainly resonated in the profession at large. There 
is nothing wrong with it in principle, but I think that it has been a blind 
alley in practice.
The reason is that, in practice, the demand for micro foundations 
almost had to become a demand to build macroeconomic models on 
Walrasian foundations. If the felt need was for a formal connection, 
if a sound macro model had to be the aggregation of a complete, 
developed micro model, then Walras was all we had available off-the- 
shelf. The trouble is that Walrasian general equilibrium theory begins 
by assuming away all of the problems that make macroeconomics in 
teresting. (The Elements is not a book about business cycles, after all, 
but precisely the opposite.) The consequence of this historical accident 
has been that much high-caliber mental effort has gone into elaborate 
attempts to prove that unemployment is either nonexistent or healthy.
It will be noticed that I have not used the phrase "rational expecta 
tions" to characterize new-classical macroeconomics. That is because 
I think that the assumption of rational expectations is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for new-classical results. What is characteristic of the 
school arises even without rational expectations. It depends rather on 
two other, apparently less plausible, assumptions: that all markets are 
smoothly cleared by flexible prices, and that all business decisions are 
merely the carrying-out of the atemporal and intertemporal wishes of 
the households that own the firms. (That would account for the popularity
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of representative-agent models in this tradition.) Conversely, if you start 
with, say, a Benassy-Malinvaud fixed-price model, in which markets 
are foredoomed not to clear, then adding in rational expectations can 
easily reinforce its Keynesian air. The main thing adding rational ex 
pectations does for a modeler is to allow multiple equilibria, and that 
is not especially good news for new-classicism.
A sharp version of the basic new-classical claim is that there is no 
specifically macroeconomic problem distinct from the general economic 
problem of scarcity. Presumably there could be, but in our world it 
does not happen. What you are seeing when you look at business cycle 
fluctuations is an economy adjusting optimally to exogenous real shocks 
to taste and technology, to changes in the weather, for instance. (I am 
describing the later version of this stance, usually called "real business 
cycle theory" rather than the earlier version that was more akin to 
monetarism in locating the main source of disturbance in monetary 
shocks.) Thus if there are cycles, they are adaptive rather than dysfunc 
tional (apart perhaps from some unavoidable noise). Of course we all 
wish we were richer (i.e., more productive) and we all wish we could 
predict the future better, but neither is a meaningful object of 
macroeconomic policy on the business cycle time scale.
Let me be even more explicit. You are asked to believe that the real 
economy behaves as if a single immortal consumer were making op 
timal resource allocation decisions, intratemporally and intertemporal- 
ly, constrained only by technology and available information. This 
already assumes that the production economy simply responds to the 
consumer's wishes. You must decide if that is a credible assertion.
I must tell you that there are no great empirical or predictive suc 
cesses associated with this theory. If it said anything, it said that the 
disinflation of 1979-83 would be accomplished without a recession. That 
turned out to be false, of course. Is there a defense? Yes: it can be said 
that the conditions for a controlled test of the theory were not met, that 
the disinflationary monetary policy was not credible, for example. The 
practical man's comment that we are not likely ever to get a more credible 
disinflationary monetary policy can be shrugged off. The trouble is that 
it is always possible to claim that the conditions for a controlled ex-
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periment have not been adequately met, so to say it in this instance is 
not to say much.
New-classical macroeconomics likes to take a rather different view 
of empirical verification. It prefers to set itself the task of reproducing, 
at least qualitatively, the pattern of variances and covariances in observed 
time series, and it pats itself on the back whenever it succeeds in doing 
so to an acceptable approximation. I think this is a misleading procedure; 
but the point I want to make is a general one and it applies on my own 
side of the fence as well. The trouble with judging the empirical validi 
ty of theories in this way is that the test almost certainly has low power 
against many interesting alternatives. That is to say: many other models 
of the economy can do just about as well in fitting that limited class 
of facts. The conclusion is that even "success" of this kind provides 
reason to accept new-classical macroeconomics only if it is preferred 
for other reasons. If you find it implausible, as I do, then you are not 
in the slightest obliged to accept it on its own empirical grounds. And 
of course the same goes for other theories, unless they can produce em 
pirical tests with considerably more discriminatory power than these.
Here, I think, is an important contribution to understanding the 
widespread, perpetual, and apparently endemic disagreement that 
characterizes macroeconomics to the distress of all of us. Deep down, 
we all know that, as soon as we come to truly subtle questions, 
econometrics does not substitute well for the controlled experiment as 
a device for discriminating between competing theories. One has the 
uncomfortable feeling that if you try hard enough always on subtle 
and complicated matters you can find data, functional forms, statistical 
techniques, lag structures, that will tell you what you want to hear. 
Economics is not alone in this, by the way. A tuned-in person can see 
the same thing happening with global climate models as they look for 
traces of the theoretically reasonable greenhouse effect. Their problem 
is much the same as ours. The questions are subtle, the data are noisy, 
and there are many forces at work simultaneously.
There is a lesson here for macroeconomics, I think. To begin with, 
we should stick to first-order questions and accept only robust answers, 
at least when we are being serious. I have no objection to playing around, 
trying things out; that is one of the ways we learn. But for public con-
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sumption, the standards should be different. Second, we are not only 
entitled to use common sense and to make judgments of plausibility based 
on general observation, but there is no sensible alternative to doing so. 
Such conclusions are vulnerable; that goes without saying. They have 
to be defended without rancor and without cant. And finally, in so do 
ing, the broadest possible variety of evidence should be mobilized. There 
are other roads to knowledge besides formal statistical inference. They 
have to be used critically, as does formal econometrics for that matter, 
but we cannot afford to dismiss any bit of information the world offers.
You will have gathered that the new-classical way of going about 
macroeconomics is not my preferred way. But I would not advocate 
going back to the "hydraulic" Keynesianism of the 1960s even if that 
were possible. The key to doing better, I think, is to pay attention to 
the "macro foundations of microeconomics." I hope I mean something 
more that cuteness by that phrase: I mean, roughly, that we are entitled 
to ask what sorts of microeconomic mechanisms both look right and 
do justice to the nature of the general economic environment in which 
they are expected to function.
There is now a self-conscious "New Keynesian Macroeconomics" 
that tries to do just that. One wing of it tends to emphasize transactions 
costs, information asymmetries and similar imperfections, and shows 
that, in that kind of environment, the economy by itself can easily achieve 
unsatisfactory states (equilibria) which might be improved by correc 
tive fiscal and monetary policy. There is another strand that places greater 
emphasis on imperfect competition, increasing returns to scale, and 
trading externalities the tendency for optimistic (pessimistic) choices 
by some to validate optimistic (pessimistic) choices by others. These 
mechanisms lead to the conclusion that the economy may be capable 
of many self-sustaining equilibria, some much better than others. I have 
a fairly vague feeling that this second approach is on to something deeper 
than the first. That feeling it is not much more than that governs my 
choice of illustrative examples for non-Panglossian macroeconomics.
To start off, let me refer back to IS-LM-based American Keyne 
sianism. Most of the time, as I mentioned, it rested on the hypothesis 
that the nominal wage was the sticky price that kept the labor market 
from clearing at full employment. (In the standard version, the price
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level for goods was taken as perfectly flexible. One of the advances 
made by the Benassy-Malinvaud fixed-price literature was to enlarge 
the picture by treating the goods market and the labor market more sym 
metrically.) Since the nominal wage is not permanently fixed, textbooks 
pointed out, and many still point out, that the nominal wage adjusts 
only slowly to the state of the labor market. The model is then one of 
disequilibrium, possibly prolonged. Underemployment lasts as long as 
the disequilibrium lasts.
Now Keynes himself certainly believed that the nominal wage was 
sticky in this sense in Britain during the 1920s and 1930s. He even sug 
gested why that might be: because resistance to nominal wage cuts in 
a decentralized labor market is the only way that workers can defend 
their relative position in the wage structure. It is less well remembered 
that0 Keynes argued that wage stickiness was probably a good thing, 
that perfect wage and price flexibility could easily be destructive of real 
economic stability. His reasoning went like this. In a monetary economy, 
the nominal interest rate cannot be negative. Hence the real interest 
rate must be at least equal to the rate of deflation. (That is what holding 
cash would earn, after all.) If wages and prices were to fall freely after 
a contractionary shock, the real interest rate could become very large 
at just the wrong time, with adverse effects on investment. The induc 
ed secondary contraction would only worsen the situation.
I can report that Frank Hahn and I have verified Keynes's intuition 
within a model that is in every respect respectable. That is to say, we 
can exhibit situations in which complete wage flexibility, while main 
taining full employment after a shock, drives the model economy off 
on completely unstable trajectories of pointlessly fluctuating output that 
never return to the original steady-state equilibrium. Somewhat slower 
wage adjustment would make things better, not worse. And there is 
a (complicated) monetary-fiscal policy that is in principle capable of 
nipping the whole process in the bud and getting over the initial shock 
with minimal disturbance.
The point of this exercise is not to demonstrate the wisdom of the 
Great Lama. It is much more devious. If perfect wage (and price) flex 
ibility is not always the best way to run an economy, then it is perhaps 
less peculiar that economies should develop institutions that limit or
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discourage aggressive wage-cutting in times of moderate unemployment. 
Hahn and I have actually produced a formal model of just that kind. 
In it the labor market is modeled as a kind of repeated game involving 
workers and employers. We show that there is an equilibrium strategy 
for workers in which the unemployed refrain from competing for jobs, 
as long as the unemployment rate is not too high. What makes this an 
equilibrium strategy (i.e., one from which it pays no individual to depart 
unilaterally) is the threat that any violation of the norm will lead to a 
long period of unrestrained competition in the labor market. In that event 
no worker does better than the reservation wage, whereas adhering to 
the norm gives even currently unemployed workers the expectation of 
sooner or later acquiring a job at something higher than the reservation 
wage.
There is a general methodological lesson here, and it is what I am 
after. The model just described has many equilibria; in fact there will 
generally be a whole interval of wage rates and corresponding unemploy 
ment rates, any one of which could persist if once established. (Which 
one actually occurs may then be a matter of historical accident.) The 
point is that this multiplicity of equilibria arises easily as soon as one 
gets away from the notion that price-mediated market clearing is the 
only equilibrium concept worth discussing. Noncooperative game theory 
has taught us that the fundamental idea of an equilibrium is the 
"strategic" definition I have used here, a choice of behavior patterns 
that leaves no participant impelled to make a unilateral change. If it 
seems to you, as it does to me, that the current state of the economy 
could have been different I am suggesting a thought-experiment about 
positions of rest, not about short-run dynamics then the idea that there 
can be many self-sustaining equilibria should be your cup of tea.
The non-Panglossian branch of modern macroeconomic theory has 
produced some other models that fall into this same category. Several 
of them rest on an idea that goes back into business cycle theory well 
before the General Theory, what I earlier called a trading externality. 
It is, in far too simple terms, the notion that widespread optimism is 
self-justifying, but so is widespread pessimism. Businesses and 
households who are optimistic about their own market prospects will 
make decisions that, taken together, create strong markets and thus
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validate their initial optimism. If they had all been pessimistic to begin 
with, they would have done things that validated their initial pessimism. 
If you can believe that then you believe that there are (at least) two 
equilibria, a high-level one and a low-level one. It would not be too 
far-fetched to think of one as prosperity and the other as recession.
Needless to say, that simple thought is not even a sketch of a sketch 
of a theory. All the economics remains to be done. But it has been done, 
several times in several contexts. Just by way of example, Walter P. 
Heller (the son of my old leader at the Council of Economic Advisers) 
has studied an economy consisting of two monopolistically competitive 
industries, each of which sells only to the employees of the other. (This 
artificial-sounding condition would seem quite natural if there were many 
industries. It is meant to serve a reasonable purpose.) As imperfect com 
petitors, each firm has to form expectations about the location of its 
demand curve. In effect, then, it must form expectations about the 
production and employment decisions of the other industry. The other 
industry is meanwhile doing exactly the same thing. With a few unrestric- 
tive conditions on demand-elasticities, Heller is able to show that the 
optimism-pessimism story actually holds in this set-up. There can in 
deed be two or more self-sustaining equilibria and it is no trick at all 
to describe reasonable conditions under which the high-level equilibrium 
is clearly better for everyone than the low-level one. This model has 
the amusing property that the government can bring about the high- 
level equilibrium simply by announcing in a convincing way that it will 
do so. If the announcement is believed, the government will never ac 
tually have to do anything. This economy has nothing to fear, one might 
say, but fear itself.
A different and in some ways more powerful conceptualization of 
the same general idea can be found in the model of' 'search equilibrium'' 
proposed by my colleague Peter Diamond. In Diamond's story, people 
"accept productive opportunities," some of which are more advan 
tageous than others, produce goods, and then look for buyers, who are 
people just like themselves, having produced something to sell. Buyers 
and sellers are completely symmetrical; we can call them traders. It 
is better to be a trader when there are lots of traders, because then it 
is easier to find a partner with whom a mutually profitable exchange
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can be carried out. If there are a lot of traders, then I will be inclined 
to accept somewhat less attractive productive opportunities. Better market 
prospects justify greater production. By acting like that, of course, I 
add to the number of traders out there and thus justify greater produc 
tion by others. Diamond is able to show that this set-up, too, is very 
likely to provide two or more self-sustaining equilibria; when it does, 
the ones with more output and employment are better than the ones with 
less. In an added tour de force, Diamond and Fudenberg prove that 
this model can even produce regular business cycles in its primitive 
form of economic activity, each phase leading regularly to the next.
It is a fair criticism of the approach to macroeconomics that I have 
been describing (and favoring) that it seems to produce only a collec 
tion of fragments. The new-classical scheme at least produces a com 
plete model that can be equipped with empirically based parameters 
and simulated. Its behavior can then be checked against selected 
characteristics of the world of observation. The older American Keyne- 
sianism went even further and culminated in the large econometric 
models that still grind out detailed forecasts month after month. (There 
are, of course, smaller models too.) The more recent shoots from the 
Keynesian tree have the character of examples, illustrations of 
possibilities. They are sometimes phrased in fanciful ways, as if to em 
phasize that they are not intended for econometric treatment.
There are two responses to this criticism. One is simply that it will 
take time to develop these newer possibilities into a form fit for em 
pirical application. That may indeed be true; but it is not the response 
I want to make. To my mind, the role of macro theory (even, in a sense, 
applied macro theory) is not necessarily to make a single all-purpose 
model to represent the world. It is certainly not unconditional forecasting. 
It is rather the uncovering of mechanisms that cause the economic system 
to malfunction in significant ways, and then the analysis of kinds of 
policy measures, directions of policy even if not exact doses, that are 
potentially therapeutic. I would resist the notion that the market failures 
in question are "mere aberrations" of the system; they are the system. 
Nevertheless, my sort of macroeconomics is inevitably less monolithic 
than the other. This may explain the attractiveness of the new-classical 
model; it looks much more like a candidate for System of the World.
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If neatness is your dominant concern, and I offer you a menu that in 
cludes a whole bunch of little models, not easily put together, a certain 
kind of mind will choose "None of the above" even if that answer 
violates common sense.
How might this version of macroeconomics evolve? One could im 
agine continued analytical study of these and other mechanisms that give 
rise to occasional recessions and bursts of inflation, along with an ongo 
ing attempt to evaluate their importance in the modern economy. This 
effort would be partly econometric, partly institutional discussion, story- 
telling, educated judgment, all of those things, but I would certainly 
look for rough quantification. Notice how there will be room for dif 
ferences of opinion even within this paradigm. Especially if the key 
concept is the multiplicity of equilibria, there will always be the em 
pirical problem of characterizing the sort of equilibrium the economy 
is in at the moment, and choosing the relevant model.
Perhaps I am suggesting moving away from the image of economics 
as the physics of society toward the image of economics as something 
more like ecology or medicine or cell biology. I am not referring to 
any analogy of content, but just a view of scientific effort that is less 
formal and general and reductive, and more tolerant of a variety of 
models suited to a variety of problems and contexts. From that point 
of view the sort of model developed so elegantly and attractively by 
Lucas and Prescott is just one of many possible mechanisms; its ap- 
plicaoility has to be argued anew in each concrete situation. In optimistic 
moments, I think that evolution has already started.
This apparently academic subject is actually real and relevant and 
contemporary. There seems to be general agreement that the probability 
of a recession in the United States before the end of 1990 is something 
like one-third. Suppose it happens. What will we do? What will the 
Democratic Congress think is the right stance for the federal govern 
ment? What will the Republican President propose? What will the con 
servative but more professional Federal Reserve decide to do? Will there 
be any coordination among them? And how will the argument be 
conducted?
There are two main currents of thought that have their existence both 
inside and outside professional economics. One is generally laissezfaire.
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It says that the unfettered private enterprise economy is well-behaved 
and self-correcting. Whatever it does, however it behaves, is probably 
all for the best. The optimal government policy is to get out of the way. 
The recession will run its course, and anyway it is not really a reces 
sion. The other main attitude says that although there is nothing basically 
wrong with the free enterprise economy, there are certain areas where 
it is vulnerable to market failure. Some of these are "microeconomic"  
like excessive pollution or misleading labels on food and require regula 
tion of some kind. But there is also macroeconomic market failure, a 
tendency occasionally to lapse into recession a systemwide under 
production of goods and therefore underprovision of jobs or inflation 
or stagflation. That calls for compensatory stabilization policy, and 
sooner is better than later.
This dichotomy does not need academic economics to keep it going. 
It has deep roots in ideology and self-interest. But it is reflected in an 
ongoing debate within academic economics, and especially within 
macroeconomics. The debate is not in the first instance about policy 
but about the correct "model of the economy." The balance of influence 
shifts from time to time, partly in response to what happens in the real 
world (not only in the economy but also in public opinion), and partly 
in response to which side seems to have the analytical upper hand. Within 
academic economics the two sides are often labeled Keynesian and anti- 
Keynesian (currently "new-classical"). As I have explained, that is 
because a great watershed in this debate which has been going on for 
centuries occurred in 1936 with the publication of the first model of 
the economy supporting the macro failure view ever to achieve academic 
respectability. The label sticks, even if today the detailed context has 
little to do with the original. Needless to say, in this typology I would 
be classified as a Keynesian, for good reason.
Should any of this matter to citizens? I offer a partisan but I hope not 
narrow-minded answer. When the next recession rolls around, do not 
be seduced by ideology into believing that government is necessarily 
part of the problem and cannot be part of the solution. Government 
often is part of the problem because it is often incompetent, often 
dominated by false beliefs about the world, often moved by ulterior 
motives. But there is no general theoretical truth that guides you one
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way or the other. You should try to listen as impartially as you can 
manage to analyses offered by economists of every persuasion, trying 
to get at the picture of the world, today's world, that underlies each 
diagnosis. Then you should fearlessly form judgments, fearlessly but 
tentatively. Above all, you should try not to be bored.
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Conceptual Issues
Econometrics blends the disciplines of economics, mathematics, and 
statistics. All too often the reciprocity of these three disciplines is 
neglected. It is my feeling that an appropriate combination of all three 
inputs can be extremely fruitful in gaining insight into the economy, 
and that concentration on one or two alone will be less useful for this 
purpose. I have spent more than 45 years looking at economic issues 
through the medium of econometrics: while I do not believe that this 
is the only approach, I do believe that it is the best approach for quan 
tifiable matters. There are, of course, some important and interesting 
philosophical, historical, and qualitative problems in economics that 
do not lend themselves to the econometric method.
This essay is about the present state of macroeconomic theory and 
policy as it relates to econometrics. It will be concerned with the statistical 
basis for quantifying these subjects. The evolution and present state of 
techniques, applications, and the information set will be examined, and 
future tendencies will be indicated.
Econometrics is a broad subject, applicable to many specializations, 
but I shall limit this survey to macroeconometrics the use of
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econometrics for the study of the macroeconomy. Econometrics is a 
branch of quantitative economics, and the macroeconomic data base- 
particularly the structure and availability of data is very important.
Macroeconomic Theory and Policy
Economic analysis of theory and policy are often confused, particularly 
with regard to the implementation of policy in the real world. The worst 
manifestation of this confusion appears in media discussions about 
business, finance, and economics, but it occurs also in more serious 
presentations. For example, Keynesian economics is said to be con 
cerned only with deficit spending or classical economics only with finan 
cial orthodoxy. It is true that Keynesian economics examines fiscal policy 
and, under some conditions, advocates deficit spending, but for a very 
long time Keynesians have recognized the limitations of a simplistic 
approach. Classical economics does not rigidly support orthodox 
monetary control for every macroeconomic deficiency.
First, we must make a distinction between theory and policy. 
Macroeconomic theory involves the construction of a system of thought 
that describes behavior of the economy as a whole the aggregate 
economy. One approach is to build that system up from the aggrega 
tion of microeconomic relationships. This approach is very attractive 
but not unique. Macroeconomic relationships also may be considered 
to have a life of their own and can be specified directly, without in 
tricate appeal to microeconomics and the theory of aggregation. The 
resulting system is also not unique, as in the "adding-up" approach.
Having established a macroeconomic theoretical framework and 
specified it mathematically, we may then confront it with relevant data, 
estimate the system, and use it for policy analysis. That is what 
macroeconometrics is all about. The use of such empirical systems for 
policy analysis results in conclusions that are very rich and encompass 
many more alternatives than manipulations of fiscal deficits or money 
supply alone. Such analysis need not be econometric, but noneconometri- 
cians tend to oversimplify, because they find it awkward to handle many 
complex interrelationships simultaneously. It is from this oversimplifica 
tion and also from expository diagrams of pedagogical treatment of the
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subject that popular writers have come to consider policy in terms of 
crude stereotypes usually limited to two variables at a time.
Macroeconomic Theory
It is difficult for present-day students and research scholars to ap 
preciate just how innovative the Keynesian theory of macroeconomics 
was some 50 years ago, when it provided an extremely simple explana 
tion of the overall levels of activity and employment that seemed to 
correspond with the facts of the period. It is legitimate to criticize ear 
ly practitioners for oversimplifying the relationships involving the fiscal 
multiplier and overemphasizing the concept of effective demand. It soon 
became clear that the Keynesian macro model needed supply and finan 
cial sectors. Financial relationships of an extremely simple sort were 
incorporated from the beginning, but the technological laws of produc 
tion, marginal productivity, labor market clearance, and (absolute) price 
determination were inadequately handled. The outcome for theory 
development was that these neglected aspects were eventually incor 
porated into a system that became the Keynesian-neoclassical synthesis. 
That long-winded title is appropriate, since Keynes was truly a student 
of Marshall and reasoned strictly along the neoclassical lines that 
permeated economics in Cambridge, England. The extension of the crude 
Keynesian theory along neoclassical lines was appropriate but inade 
quate. There was only one price, one interest rate, and excessive ag 
gregation in other markets. The explanation of workers' money illu 
sion with respect to wage bargaining was contrived. In order to handle 
these problems, I developed the Phillips curve for the labor market and 
built larger theoretical systems that included many sectors of activity, 
culminating in the Keynes-Leontief model that has a full supply side. 
Aspects of income distribution and disaggregation in financial markets 
were also introduced, the latter through the term structure of interest 
rates and later through the analysis of the flow-of-funds accounts.
The distinction between classical economics cum monetarism and the 
Keynes-Leontief-neoclassical synthesis became clear through the treat 
ment of the demand for money. The monetarists base their analysis on 
the a priori predictability of velocity (either a constant, simple trend,
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or function of smooth variables). The extended Keynesians argue, im 
plicitly, that velocity depends on interest rates, which, we have learn 
ed, can be extremely volatile.
There is one other important aspect of Keynesian economic theory 
that needs to be examined. It was originally put forward as a 
macroeconomic theory for a closed economy. This is most peculiar, 
given Britain's deep economic involvement in the world and extreme 
openness. Also, Keynes was obviously deeply concerned about inter 
national economics at the time of his death, as he was one of the ar 
chitects of Bretton Woods. It may have been the bad influence of North 
American Keynesians, who took the lead in the theoretical develop 
ment of macroeconomics and reasoned, instinctively, in closed-economy 
terms. In the 1930s and the early part of the postwar period, the U.S. 
economy may have been approximately closed, but that characteristic 
gradually withered away. Most of the economic problems of this coun 
try in the last 30 years have been predominantly or wholly international.
1 believe that it is a grave deficiency of our elementary textbooks that 
they develop macroeconomics first as a self-contained explanation of 
a closed system, and then add international considerations as an after 
thought, much in the form of an amendment. The international prob 
lems of an open economy should be introduced in the first chapter dealing 
with macroeconomics and pervade the analysis in a meaningful, essen 
tial way for the whole exposition. I find it unconscionable that authors 
of elementary American textbooks ("Principles") have not done this 
on a broad scale.
The problems that arose, in whole or in part, from crude Keynesian 
theory were early fascination with the stagnation thesis, acceptance of 
euthanasia of the rentier, introduction of an inflationary bias, and an 
exaggerated belief in accuracy of the model. Economists frequently 
generalize a few years of recent experience into decades or eras. In 
the graph of interest rates, it is evident that there was a brief spell, begin 
ning in the early 1930s, when short-term interest rates were low below
2 percent but they soon picked up and reached astronomical heights 
in the United States. Rentiers who had the good perception to "lock- 
in" to the high rates on long-term debt securities which yielded returns
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of 14-16 percent at the beginning of this decade realized euphoria in 
stead of euthanasia.
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The long-term demographic predictions were disastrous. The vanishing 
of the frontier and the maturation of technology were equally ill- 
conceived hypotheses. The baby boom, the jet engine, the spread of 
electronic devices, and fluctuations in financial market rates (not to men 
tion many other pieces of evidence) quickly showed that there was no 
solid basis for applying the oversimplified Keynesian theory to medium- 
or long-run macroeconomic development.
The Keynesian theory was developed for European and North 
American economies, but there was a degree of generality about the 
system of thought. Some scholars may have made oversimplified ap 
plications to developing countries, but, fortunately, specialists on Third-
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World development produced more appropriate systems. The Keynes- 
Leontief model is, indeed, quite suitable for study of developing coun 
tries where the data base is adequate.
The study of market-clearing and formation of relative prices by 
classical economics, supplemented by the quantity theory of money, 
provided the main alternative macroeconomic theory, under the title 
of monetarism. Strictly speaking, monetarism deals only with the ag 
gregate relationships that determine money balances (and price levels), 
but implicitly it is associated with the classical model for the real 
economy. From a logical point of view the theory is consistent and self- 
contained, but does it work? This is an econometric question.
The fact that the builders of the St. Louis Model, a macroeconometric 
version of monetarism, must introduce the world oil price in order to 
get a satisfactory explanation of recent developments, indicates to me 
that strict monetarism does not fit the facts. The time curve of velocity 
does not exhibit steadiness or predictability, and I do find that velocity 
is significantly related to interest rates. Moreover, the most recent un- 
predicted (by monetarists) movements in velocity are generally related 
to the occurrence of financial innovation. Changes in hardware, soft 
ware, and operational characteristics of financial markets have disrupted 
the underlying monetarist relationships. They have a low degree of 
autonomy.
Now, let us turn to the modern theory of macroeconomics. Among 
most recent developments are those associated with expectations for 
mation and greater attention to supply considerations. Modern 
macroeconomic theory appears to be well aware of international dimen 
sions, but the treatment has not yet reached the level of introductory 
textbooks.
In general, there is much more attachment to market processes, but 
that is mainly a matter of degree. If the Keynes-Leontief-neoclassical 
synthesis is fully pursued, all the supply-side characteristics are covered. 
While I endorse this approach, I reach the conclusion that a full realiza 
tion of the power and implications of such a system must necessarily 
lead us to the realm of very large-scale models, with hundreds and  
more likely thousands of simultaneous relationships. Such intricate 
structures can only be handled by computer analysis of large-scale em-
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pirical models. The modern generation, however, appears to be mov 
ing in another direction, namely, towards very compact, simplified 
systems. To some extent, they reason according to a law of parsimony. 
The smallest system capable of explaining the facts of life is the one 
to be chosen. The problem with this reasoning is that the "facts of life" 
are very narrowly prescribed. Little attention is paid to a very wide 
range of facts, especially potential future events that are not present at 
the time of the investigations. They are not ready for embargoes, 
droughts, OPEC power, financial innovation, debt default, or other con 
tingencies. In place of the rule of parsimony, my preference is for:
the largest system that can be managed, given human and 
data resource limitations, and one that provides estimates of 
the main aggregates at least as good as those from any smaller 
system, since it also gives information on many other 
magnitudes.
Apart from using smaller systems with less comprehensive coverage 
of detail and less attention to the intricacies of the data problem, modern 
macroeconomic theory pays a great deal of attention to expectations. 
On the surface this is eminently desirable and potentially constructive. 
Expectations have for years and years been the subject of copious 
research in macroeconomic theory. Keynes devoted an entire and 
insightful chapter to the subject. 2 G. L. S. Shackle, who admired the 
Keynesian theory, wrote a book on the subject in order to advance 
knowledge by building on established lines. 3 Macroeconomic analyses 
of wage flexibility, especially in recessionary conditions, used implicit 
reasoning about expectations to refute the reliance on this feature of 
the labor market to guarantee return to full-employment equilibrium 
when the economy was deflected from that state. Macroeconometric 
modeling always relied heavily on the use of expectations, and results 
from sample surveys of households and firms were consistently brought 
to bear on the measurement of expectations.
Modern theorists then turned to own-model-generated expectations, 
misleadingly called rational expectations, to generate results by a purely 
hypothetical intellectual process without even considering whether they 
have any behavioral meaning. From a statistical point of view, they
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require the unknown model to provide estimates of expectations data 
based on parameter estimates that also depend on the expectations data. 
They surely overwork the sample, asking it to provide both the extra 
data needed and the parameter estimates based on those data.
The estimates can be computed, if the model is identified, which is 
not always the case, but the estimates may not even be unique. 4 Models 
that are so estimated give different response characteristics, in general, 
but they have not been tested to see if they provide more accurate ex 
trapolations than mainstream models. I doubt that forecast tests will 
show that such different models are superior. Direct empirical tests of 
so-called rational expectations are not kind to the concept; adaptive ex 
pectations appear to stand up better to the data. 5
An advocate of own-model-generated expectations is R. Lucas, who 
has argued on occasion that economic decisionmakers and policymak- 
ing authorities will be using the same model and coming to the same 
conclusion about expected values; therefore policies set by the latter 
will already have been taken into account by the former, thus making 
policy interventions futile. There are many arguments against this view 
besides the unreality of own-model-generated expectations. Models differ 
widely among the population, and noise elements obscure common 
signals.
In another line of argument, Lucas asserts (without testing) that 
parameters in macroeconomic models are functions of policy in 
struments: when instruments are changed, people's reactions will 
automatically change and possibly negate the intended changes sought 
by the policy makers. Of course, variable parameters have long been 
investigated in macroeconomic models. Either they contribute to 
nonlinearities, which can be unfolded back to stable parameters, or they 
are random parameters, or they vary according to a wide range of fac 
tors that are not necessarily closely related to policy instruments.
Lucas' approach is a contrived theory that is known, in advance, to 
recommend noninterventionism. It is not known, however, to be related 
at all to the actual formation of expectations.
A difficulty with the modern approach is that if it does not automatical 
ly make policy intervention futile, it does make it very indefinite depend 
ing on just how the expectations are generated by the own-model.
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A verifiable theory of expectations can, however, be measured, 
estimated for model use, and studied for policy response that turns out 
to be more definite, apart from the fact that the findings are subject 
to error and should be surrounded by confidence intervals.
Macroeconomic Policy
Keynesian macroeconomic theory was originally developed as a basis 
for policy intervention to save the Western market economies that had 
lapsed into severe recession in the late 1920s and 1930s. Apart from 
the ill-considered stagnation thesis and other longer-range perspectives, 
the theory was reasonably well conceived for the recovery policies pro 
moted through fiscal stimuli. Classical-minded economists warned 
against inflation, but that concern was not actually realized until the 
major economies had recovered to high employment levels for a sus 
tained period during the reconstruction phase after the Second World 
War. Both tax and expenditure policies were actively used, and monetary 
policy was introduced as interest rates were allowed or encouraged to 
rise. An early bias in favor of fiscal rather than monetary policy for 
stabilization, among Keynesians, was soon abandoned, and both were 
used in tandem. In addition, econometric simulation of models soon 
gave evidence that fiscal policy needed to be accommodated by monetary 
policy; otherwise a fiscal stimulus or restraint would peter out or turn 
perverse. There was no problem among neo-Keynesian theoreticians 
and econometricians in developing the analysis in this direction and seek 
ing balanced policies in which fiscal and monetary policies reinforce 
each other.
Just as there was little concern about inflation as long as there was 
significant excess supply during the 1930s, there was little concern about 
international economic affairs particularly exchange-rate movements  
as long as the Bretton Woods agreements were in effect during the 1950s 
and 1960s. Inflation and flooding the world with dollars as a result of 
poor policy implementation of Vietnam War finance caused the Bret 
ton Woods system of fixed parities to break down. During the 1970s, 
policymakers had to cope with supply-side shocks from food and fuel 
prices, general inflation, and fluctuating exchange rates. A major policy
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prescription was to control inflation through the use of social contracts- 
incomes policies. Here we came to a standoff in terms of economic 
analysis of policy. The monetarists argued that strict control of the money 
supply was the only way to deal with inflation, while many Keynesians 
argued for incomes policies.
Monetarists argued that incomes policies never worked, and, at the 
end of the 1970s, policies of orthodox monetary tightening were adopted, 
both in the United States and in Europe in Germany on the continent, 
and in Britain. It should be noted that Austria had successfully used 
an incomes policy and held inflation in check while growing nicely. 6
Monetarism prevailed and brought down inflation, but the cost was 
very high. The world went through the severest recession of the postwar 
period. Apart from the fact that incomes policies were not given a prop 
er trial, the blunt application of monetarist policy failed to give ap 
propriate note to the decline in commodity prices that began in 1981-82. 
The United States and other countries had adjusted to the change in 
the terms of trade for energy. Conservation was impressive, new 
discoveries were made, and interfuel substitution relieved many short 
ages. These developments started to break the power of OPEC. Grain 
supplies became ample and commodity prices, besides fuel and food, 
leveled off or declined. Belatedly, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury 
and Federal Reserve governors recognized that inflation is closely related 
to world commodity price movements, but not in time to save the world 
from overkill in 1981-82. 7
Economic policy in the 1970s and 1980s became much more market- 
oriented. Economists became conservative, turning away from interven 
tion, along the lines of Lucas and the monetarists, and towards deregula 
tion. The point was repeatedly made that the market process led to bet 
ter judgments than could be implemented by government policy makers. 
This stalled and eventually killed an effective energy policy. It was us 
ed as an argument against industrial policy, which had been so suc 
cessful in the expansion of the Japanese economy during the 1960s. 
In general, the economics profession rejected indicative planning or in 
dustrial policy and argued for deregulation. There was near-complete 
deregulation of airlines and partial deregulation in the financial sector,
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particularly in banking. While there have been some impressive gains 
from deregulation, there also have been some very serious side effects. 
A lax attitude towards regulation, encouragement of deregulation, and 
implicit faith in the power of the market have contributed to a severely 
weakened financial sector, hundreds of bank failures, excessive activi 
ty in mergers and acquisitions, large debt structures to burden corpora 
tions, and an atmosphere that culminated in Black Monday (October 
19, 1987).
It is not difficult to see why politicians might be willing to take risks 
and expose the economy to increased variability and fluctuation. They 
come and go, according to voter preference, but it is not easy for me 
to understand why professional economists have become so tolerant of 
policies that lead to social risk.
The macroeconomy is presently functioning well in terms of GNP 
growth, unemployment, inflation and other indicators. The laity and 
politicians claim that it is, in fact, a period of prosperity. But the economy 
has reached this position amid serious problems the internal and ex 
ternal deficits, widely fluctuating exchange rates, an exposed banking 
system, debt burdening some of our most important trading partners 
in the Third World, and high-level unemployment in Europe. These 
foreign problems loom large for us because the United States is so in 
volved in the world economy. In making projections of the ability of 
our government to overcome the internal fiscal deficit position, steady 
growth at a modest level is assumed to occur, year after year, as though 
the business cycle had been outlawed. Such presumptions have proved 
to be disastrous in the past, yet economist advisors to policymakers are 
loathe to forecast cyclical downturns, in spite of the fact that they have 
occurred with a fair degree of regularity for more than 100 years.
Keynesian macroeconomic theory was designed to deal with a cyclical 
depression, and dynamic extensions of the theory generated regular 
cycles. It was recognized at an early stage that credible forecasts would 
have to be made in order to implement the theory's policy recommen 
dations. The forecasting techniques are difficult, frustrating, and tedious, 
so much so that practitioners frequently give up and profess to "feel 
their way" blindly in reacting to events. I agree that forecasting is dif-
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ficult, but I feel that it cannot be avoided. The reactive procedure will 
consistently be too slow to be effective. Both contemporary policy (one 
year or shorter horizon) and medium-term policy (up to 10 years ahead) 
require a forward look in order to make policy fit the factual situation 
when it is realized. It is true that unreliability remains, but econometric 
forecasting methods are our only tools, and they do work at least as 
well as personal judgment. In the short run, they provide fairly accurate 
guidelines. In the longer run, two procedures come to our assistance. 
Rolling forecasts should be made for the medium-term horizon. Every 
quarter or year, forecasters should update a new look-ahead for an ex 
tended horizon. The medium-term outlook will change, but this pro 
cedure should enable policymakers to stay in touch with the changing 
situation.
Naturally, the further ahead one tries to forecast, the less certain is 
the point forecast. The error band may grow substantially enough to 
discourage the policymaker but all economic choices must be made 
in an environment disturbed by "noise" in the economy. The situation 
can be made more manageable by discounting both the point projec 
tion and the error or confidence bands back to the present. If the dis 
count factor is, let us say, 10 percent and if the error bands grow no 
faster than 10 percent annually, the margin of uncertainty can be restrain 
ed to a manageable interval that is not so large as to render the 
policymaker uncomfortable.
Will economic forecasts ever improve? Paul Samuelson once remarked 
that we have perhaps reached the asymptotic level of precision that we 
can expect to attain. 8 This may be true, but Stephen McNees has in 
dicated that the precision of macroeconometric forecasts has gradually 
improved between the 1950s and 1980s, with a detour during the tur 
bulent 1970s. 9 No other systematic study over such a long time has ever 
been made, but the record for macroeconometric forecasts does look 
promising; that is another reason why I say that this is our only tool.
We have tried using sample surveys, quarterly instead of annual data, 
time series models (ARIMA or VAR), but nothing has shown the decisive 
power of a breakthrough. I do not think that models with own-generated 
expectations will produce impressive results. There is, however, seme
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hope in this information age. The use of high-frequency data, which 
are becoming plentiful at daily, weekly, and monthly intervals, looks 
promising. There is inherently much serial dependence in economic data, 
and this can be exploited for short-run forecasts, from one to six months 
ahead. These short-run forecasts can then be used to calibrate or adjust 
quarterly econometric models of the economy as a whole. An objec 
tively adjusted model that combines time series information at high fre 
quency with the customary frequency of prevailing models may well 
lead to significant improvement of forecasts. 10 Further use of sample 
survey information in connection with modeling may enhance such im 
provements. This is the most promising lead at the moment for improving 
economic forecasts and making policy formation sounder.
I noted earlier that the Keynesian theoretical model was fully com 
patible with both monetary and fiscal policy, although early on there 
was an emphasis on fiscal policy. By contrast, classical monetarism 
would rely exclusively on monetary policy and use the tax system simply 
to collect enough revenue to pay for necessary government expenditures, 
which, according to their tastes, should be as small as possible.
The Keynesian mixture of monetary and fiscal policy should aim for 
balance. In this way the economy is not disturbed, and the burden of 
macroeconomic adjustment is equitably distributed.
At the beginning of the 1980s a new brand of economic policy came 
on the scene, labeled "supply-side economics." The theoretical base 
for this policy was simply conventional, neoclassical economics. The 
theoretical base was not at fault, but it was carelessly applied to the 
problems at hand. Proponents claimed that if tax rates were lowered, 
there would be a surge of activity that would bring in more taxes and 
keep fiscal policy in budgetary balance. On the supply side it was argued 
that people would save more and work harder if marginal tax rates were 
lowered. Another aspect of this brand of supply-side economics was 
the assertion that deregulation would improve economic efficiency. The 
end result of supply-side fiscal policies would be to avoid a recession 
and implement an anti-inflation program. As a novel theory for ac 
complishing all these fine macroeconomic objectives, this populist type 
of supply-side economics has been fully discredited. Savings did not
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rise; federal budgets were not balanced; productivity did not improve 
more than usual; and, as was mentioned already, the quality of 
deregulated services deteriorated so much so that financial services' 
activity nearly brought on a world crisis of enormous dimensions.
Another consequence of ill-considered applications of supply- side 
economics was that policy became seriously unbalanced. The strong 
reduction in tax rates created such a fiscal deficit that monetary policy 
was the only viable tool for maintaining economic order. This pressure 
on the application of monetary policy led to extremely high interest rates, 
which imposed a severe burden on the housing market and on borrowers 
in the developing world, not to mention bank lenders both abroad and 
at home particularly in sensitive markets such as Oklahoma, Texas, 
and California.
These unbalanced policies induced a recovery from the recession, 
and the ensuing deficits were so large that the ordinary Keynesian 
stimulus of deficit spending led the U.S. economy into a decent revival 
in the real sector. Financial sectors remained in disarray in the aftermath.
Macroeconometric methods monitored this policy path quite well; 
that is why Stephen McNees' findings show improved forecasts in the 
1980s. These methods also indicated at the very beginning that tax coef 
ficients associated with saving, labor supply, and investment would not 
be strong enough to bring about the gains being sought for savings and 
work effort.
The deregulation aspect of supply-side economics, as it is being prac 
ticed, relies increasingly on the market mechanism. This is not necessary 
for emphasis on the supply side, for industrial policy provides a supply- 
side approach to policy, without being free-market-oriented. Similar 
ly, the structure of centrally planned and developing economies focuses 
on the supply side, but the presence or absence of free markets is ir 
relevant. In their treatment of the debt problem in the Third World, 
U.S. authorities since 1980 have tied concessionary treatment to the 
ideology of free-market economics. Although this approach has not yet 
been successful, many economists support the free-market emphasis.
In official negotiations with centrally planned economies in Europe 
and Asia, both the United States and other Western countries have strong-
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ly supported economic reforms that introduce more market mechanisms. 
These events have much to do with political economy, but they are also 
related to the subject of this paper, namely, developments in 
macroeconometrics. Macroeconometric model building is very much 
alive in China and is used to throw light on the reform process. It is 
also used in Eastern Europe especially in Poland and Hungary  
although the effort there is academic rather than oriented towards of 
ficial policy. The macroeconometric modeling of the USSR was original 
ly done in the United States and Japan, but it does seem to be gaining 
ground now in the Soviet Union as a result of reform efforts. 11
These models track the economy well and show the inflationary 
pressures. In North America and Europe, as well as in Japan, Australia, 
and New Zealand, the paradigm model is in the IS-LM framework, 
with the usual challenges from the monetarist side. Small macro models 
can be constructed directly from aggregative data to produce IS-LM 
graphics, or large scale models can be reduced to maquettes that show 
the same kinds of core features. It is my contention that in a statistical 
context, the IS-LM paradigm crowds out the monetarist paradigm for 
industrial countries. 12
It is difficult to specify the corresponding paradigm for the centrally 
planned or developing economy, but it does appear that the two-gap 
model shows great promise. Chinese colleagues have succeeded in con 
structing small two-gap econometric models of China. This is interesting 
because China covers, simultaneously, the centrally planned and the 
developing country cases. Oddly enough, the two-gap model with a 
monetarist-type equation for price-level determination seems to fit the 
Chinese data very well and deal with the present tendency towards high 
inflation rates. This paradigm can be used to analyze Chinese economic 
policy by showing the effects of importing, exporting, and exploiting 
technical progress for growth. It could be extended to deal with such 
financial matters as foreign-exchange-reserve position, debt-service 
burden, and other problems related to financial capital flows. Model 
building was feasible in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe before 
the onset of price reform. Technological relationships, choice subject 
to given prices, and foreign trade fit well into regular statistical patterns,
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but liberalization in Hungary opened the way for more extensive 
macroeconometric work. Under perestroika this development should 
be accelerated. Since 1978, China has been liberalizing, producing more 
meaningful data, and starting to construct usable models. Early ver 
sions were built by Lawrence Lau, but by now Chinese econometri- 
cians have acquired the capability, and macroeconometric models of 
China are likely to be as much in evidence as those of Ppland, Hungary, 
and Yugoslavia. Since many of the China models will be built in state 
agencies, they will have the potential for use in macroeconomic policy 
formation.
Some Methodological Developments
There are two modern tendencies in macroeconometrics. One is the 
fascination of a younger generation with model-consistent expectations, 
that is, expected values are generated by the very models that are being 
estimated. This is being done on a large scale, but we have yet to see 
how such values stand up under the stern test of forecasting ability. 
They have no "track-record," and this must be established in order 
to gain credibility. Many U.K. models now have model-generated ex 
pectations and will eventually build up a track record.
A second tendency is to turn to time series analysis without much 
input from economics. I stressed earlier that econometrics is based on 
three disciplines, one of which is economics. When Tjalling Koopmans 
wrote his celebrated review of Burns and Mitchell's treatise on business 
cycle analysis, he meant by "theory" both economic and statistical 
theory. 13 The modern reliance on time series analysis leans heavily on 
statistical theory but is nearly empty in the field of economics.
Time series analysis can be interesting in searching for and describ 
ing relationships or hypotheses about the macroeconomy, but it is 
awkward to apply this methodology to scenario or policy analysis. The 
VAR versions assume that all variables are endogenous. How well will 
this kind of theoretical specification serve us when there is an oil em 
bargo or similar supply-side shock? Will it survive an event like the 
breakdown of Bretton Woods? This is not to say that the mainstream 
structural model can foresee such momentous events, but once an event
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occurs, the structural model is readily capable of analyzing its effects. 
Structural model builders in macroeconometrics should not ignore 
the powerful contributions of time series analysis, but they should not 
replace structural models by pure empirical analysis. The combination 
of high-frequency time series analysis with mainstream structural quarter 
ly models, cited above, is but one way of combining time series with 
structural models. In fact, E. Philip Howrey of the Michigan Model 
group recommends forming a weighted average of a small monthly 
(VAR) time series model with a structural (Michigan) econometric 
model. There are other fruitful possibilities for drawing on time series 
analysis, such as the updating of parameter estimates as a sample evolves 
through time.
Concluding Remarks
Early in my professional career, I was impatient with the resistance 
to the introduction of Keynesian macroeconomics. I also enjoyed con 
frontation with established nonmathematical economists who resisted 
the introduction of mathematical methods and econometrics for the study 
of our subject. Eventually, the quantitative approach triumphed, and 
econometrics cum mathematical economics became common practice.
I feel uncomfortable now resisting some changes in macroecon 
ometrics. Much of the new work is very good, although I find it hard 
to perceive a true breakthrough in the vast volume of research material 
that is being published. My problem is with the sterility of those aspects 
that have become very popular and enthrall young, fertile, productive 
minds without offering clear advancement of the science.
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I am pleased and honored to participate once again in this valuable 
series, and I congratulate the University and my hosts on its 25th birth 
day. The topic this year is very broad. I shall confine myself to the 
area of my greatest interest and experience, macroeconomic theory. 
It happens also to be the arena of the liveliest controversies over substance 
and methodology during the past 20 years. I suspect that the revolu 
tions or counterrevolutions in macroeconomics may be the principal 
reasons that the organizers of this series invited the speakers to com 
ment on the present state of economic science.
Even macroeconomic theory is too general for one essay. After a brief 
methodological introduction, I shall narrow my focus to a specific 
substantive issue, to what in my opinion is the fundamental issue of 
macroeconomics: the existence, reliability, strength, and speed of ad 
justments by which a market economy maintains or restores 
economy wide equilibrium between the supplies of labor and of the prod 
ucts of labor and the demands for those services and goods. A half cen 
tury ago, during the Great Depression, intense debate on this issue split 
the economics profession between John Maynard Keynes and the revolu 
tionaries he inspired, on the one side, and the defenders of established 
orthodoxy, on the other. Today the same battle is rejoined, and the same
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ground is contested with more powerful ammunition. Those who, like 
me, were young rebels in the 1930s are now, as this essay will make 
all too clear, on the defensive. Whatever you may think about the merits 
of the controversy, you may find it interesting to relate the new debate 
to the old one on the same issue.
I begin with a general discussion of methodologies, old and new, in 
macroeconomics.
The "Micro Foundations" Methodology 
of Modern Macroeconomics
Macroeconomics has been a distinct field in economic theory only 
since Keynes's 1936 book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money. The word "macroeconomics" itself, adopted to distinguish 
the study of economies as a whole from the study of households, 
businesses, markets, and sectors, "microeconomics," is of even more 
recent vintage. The central paradigm of economic theory begins with 
"micro" as the calculus of rational self-interested behavior by individual 
decisionmakers. They determine their supplies of and demands for 
multitudes of commodities by maximizing their incomes of their utilities 
subject to the constraints of their resources. Competitive markets coor 
dinate their choices, balancing demands for all commodities with sup 
plies. Prices adjust to clear all markets. Through the responses of ra 
tional economic agents to these price signals, markets transmute micro 
selfishness and myopia into optimal social allocations of resources as 
if by an' 'invisible hand,'' to quote the famous metaphor of Adam Smith. 
The theory of general equilibrium, perhaps the most impressive intellec 
tual structure in social science, gives rigorous content to Smith's in 
tuitive conjecture. It purports to build the whole economy from the 
behaviors of individual agents. But it is a framework of analysis, rather 
than a source of specific conclusions about the signs and magnitudes 
of relationships among economic variables e.g., price and income ef 
fects on demands and supplies or effects of taxes on prices and quantities.
The shortcuts and simplifications of macroeconomics were and are 
the inevitable costs of getting interesting and testable propositions, of 
which full-blown general equilibrium theory is virtually empty. From
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Keynes on, macro model builders relied on the standard paradigms of 
neoclassical theories of the behavior of individual agents in specifying 
their behavioral equations. But Keynes and his successors had to use 
information and hypotheses about behavior other than the implications 
of optimization theory. They could appeal to empirical observation, or 
to hunches about plausibility, to place restrictions on individual 
behaviors. Moreover, aggregate relationships are the results of diverse 
behaviors of multitudes of individual agents; a structural macro equa 
tion combines assumptions about individual behavior and assumptions 
about aggregation. Macro modelers also inject realism about the in 
stitutions and economic structures of the economies they are describ 
ing. Those economies did not, do not, conform to the assumptions of 
highbrow general equilibrium, for example, perfect and complete com 
petitive markets.
Pure theorists naturally found macro models aesthetically unappeal 
ing and intellectually confusing. They criticized macro relationships as 
ad hoc because they were not explicitly derived from "first principles," 
i.e., from optimizations by individual decisionmakers. "Micro Foun 
dations!" was the rallying cry of the methodological counterrevolution 
against Keynesian economics, really against all macroeconomics. Its 
protagonists complained of the absence of explicit derivations of macro 
behavioral equations from optimization; they proposed to build a new 
macro solidly and clearly based on individual rationality. Only rela 
tionships with those micro foundations, they said, could be expected 
to be stable over the range of applications not just forecasts but also 
conditional estimates of the effects of policy interventions and other 
exogenous variations to which macroeconomics aspires. This view 
point has swept the profession.
After 15 or 20 years of methodological counterrevolution, where do 
we stand? ' 'What you gain on the swings you lose on the roundabouts.'' 
Aggregation is a tough problem, so it is just finessed. It is easy to display 
explicit micro foundations when you assume the whole private economy 
can be represented as one agent, Robinson Crusoe, or as two who dif 
fer only in age and endowment, operating in competitive markets with 
flexible prices. But of course there are no transactions in these markets
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(except in the overlapping generations model once every two-period 
lifetime). The immense volumes of transactions we actually observe 
in markets for assets and commodities are simply not explained. No 
heed is paid to all the problems of coordination and communication which 
concerned Keynes and other macro theorists the differences between 
savers and investors, lenders and borrowers, bulls and bears, risk-lovers 
and risk-averters, and so on.
Why the "representative agent" Robinson Crusoe is a less ad hoc 
and more defensible simplification than the dirty constructs of earlier 
macro modelers, and of today's macroeconometricians, is beyond me. 
I note some biases to which this methodology leads. The single-agent 
abstraction makes social welfare identical with the welfare of the in 
dividual agent. It excludes by definition any discrepancies between in 
dividual and social optima, in particular the deadweight losses due to 
involuntary unemployment, the market failure that motivated 
macroeconomics at its origins 50 years ago. The methodology treats 
government as an alien player in a two-person game with the an 
thropomorphic private sector, a game in which the government in 
comprehensibly tries to throw the private sector off its optimal solu 
tion while the private agent tries to outwit the evil or idiot policy maker. 
These biases work in a conservative and Panglossian direction.
I exaggerate. An increasing number of theoretical papers using the 
new methodology attempt to model setups in which things do not work 
out for the best and in which government may even play some beneficent 
ly corrective role. I note, however, that this role is seldom a Keyne- 
sian one, because the distortion the government can correct is seldom 
a failure of markets to clear. Moreover, because of the methodology 
those papers are, like the ones that glorify the invisible hand, logical 
exercises rather than models that seriously try to describe real-world 
economies.
Even the individual's optimization problem is simplified and specializ 
ed in the interests of analytic tractability. Utility and production func 
tions take parametric forms. By convention, equations are linear or log 
linear or are so approximated. The whole point of "micro foundations" 
is to find stable relationships that survive policy variations, exogenous
65
shocks, and the passage of time. But we have no basis for empirical 
confidence that an individual's utility function, for example, remains 
the same over her life, independently of her actual experience and en 
vironment. We certainly have no basis for assuming a utility function 
with a constant rate of relative risk aversion as a stable basis for both 
intertemporal choices and choices involving risk.
In journals, seminars, conferences, and classrooms, macroeconomic 
discussion has become a babble of parables. A macro theorist has become 
a story-teller who constructs a mythical economy in which institutions 
and environments conspire so that rational behavior in price-cleared 
markets comes up with observable outcomes that in one or two respects 
conform to stylized facts of the real world. In other respects, however, 
there is no resemblance of the mythical economy to the real world. Con 
sequently there is a big gulf between academic macroeconomics and 
the macroeconomics oriented to contemporary events and policies.
Price Rigidity—The Essential Basis of Keynesian Macroeconomics?
Keynesian economics, at least old'fashioned Keynesian economics, 
is almost always described afc dfc endent on nominal price rigidity. (The 
word "price" may be interpreted generically, to include nominal wage 
rates.) Whether the crucial rigidity characterizes labor markets or pro 
duct markets or both is an interesting but secondary issue. In any case, 
nominal price rigidity is said to be necessary to enable monetary policies 
and other nominal macroeconomic shocks to affect real aggregate de 
mand, in particular to cause real aggregate demand to deviate downward 
from real aggregate supply.
I could document the prevalence of this interpretation of Keynesian 
economics by quoting from textbooks, old and new, Keynesian and anti- 
Key nesian. I prefer to quote from a recent paper by three young stars 
of the American economics profession:
In the early 1980s, the Keynesian view of business cycles 
was in trouble. The problem was not new empirical evidence 
against Keynesian theories, but weakness in the theories
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themselves. According to the Keynesian view, fluctuations 
in output arise largely from fluctuations in nominal aggregate 
demand. These changes in demand have real effects because 
nominal prices and wages are rigid. But in Keynesian models 
of the 1970s, the crucial nominal rigidities were assumed 
rather than explained assumed directly, as in disequilibrium 
models, or introduced through theoretically arbitrary assump 
tions about labor contracts. Indeed it was clearly in the in 
terests of agents to eliminate the rigidities they were assum 
ed to create. . . . Thus the 1970s and early 1980s saw many 
economists turn away from Keynesian theories and toward 
new classical models with flexible wages and prices. 1
I quote from this paper because the authors profess sympathy for 
Keynesian economics and propose to overcome its theoretical flaws by 
deriving rigidities from "micro foundations," that is, from rational op 
timizing behaviors of individuals. They style themselves "New Keyne- 
sians."
These writers, and many others of their generation, accept the 
methodology of the neoclassical counterrevolution, but they are impress 
ed by the evidence that Keynesian macroeconomics fits empirical obser 
vations better than new classical business cycle theories. After all, Keyne 
sian economics was originally inspired by the Great Depression, for 
which the orthodoxies of the day had no explanations and no remedies. 
I believe that the depth and duration of the two most recent recessions, 
1974-75 and 1979-82 (longer in Europe), have similarly helped to 
discredit the revival of these classical orthodoxies a half century later.
Laudable though the New Keynesians' research program is, I shall 
argue that it is misguided. It is based on a misunderstanding of Keynes 
himself and of old Keynesian economics. The New Keynesians have 
accepted the terms of the debate formulated by the anti-Keynesian "new- 
classical" counterrevolutionaries. Both sides of the contemporary debate 
misrepresent and exaggerate the role of price rigidity and of nominal 
(as opposed to real) demand shocks in Keynesian macroeconomics.
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Do Flexible Prices Fully Absorb Demand Shocks Instantaneously?
First, John Maynard Keynes, in his General Theory, did not postulate 
price rigidity, or even, money wage rigidity, in the ordinary common 
sense meaning of the word. It is true that some teachers and some writers 
of elementary textbooks drew backward L's in output/price space or 
employment/money-wage space. The wage or price is constant below 
full employment or fiill employment output. At those values aggregate 
labor and product supplies become perfectly inelastic, vertical in those 
diagrams. The General Theory, Book V, says that price will rise relative 
to money wage as output and employment increase, because the real 
wage follows marginal productivity down. (In postulating diminishing 
marginal productivity and countercyclicality of real wage rates, Keynes 
was leaning over backwards to be classical. The proposition was 
challenged on empirical grounds almost immediately. Keynes accepted 
the criticism and observed correctly that his general case was strengthen 
ed if expansion could occur without declines in real wages.) The same 
Book V anticipates that the money wage itself will rise as aggregate 
employment approaches full employment.
What is true is that Keynes and Keynesians did not expect the ag 
gregate supply curve, plotting price against real output, to be vertical 
within the short run for which the Keynesian model applies. That short 
run they surely regarded as conditioned by the price and wage deter 
mined in previous periods.
Keynes and Keynesians used what Sir John Hicks has called thefix- 
price method as an expository device. The calculus of effective 
demand spending propensities and multipliers was a major innovative 
contribution of Keynesian economics, anticipating by 30 years the "dise 
quilibrium economics" of Barro and Grossman and of the French school, 
Benassy, Grandmont, and Malinvaud. The variables in this calculus are 
real quantities, output flows and their components. It was convenient 
to keep effects on and of prices to one side during the exposition, and 
it was valid so long as prices were not completely and instantaneously 
clearing markets. This expository device, taken literally, doubtless con 
tributed to the mistaken impression that absolute rigidity of prices was 
a necessary assumption.
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The second point is more basic. The critics of Keynesian theory, 
friendly new Keynesians as well as hostile new classicals, take it for 
granted that if prices were flexible that is, not rigid as they allege 
Keynes assumed then there could be no departure at all from the real 
equilibrium, no departure even in the shortest run. Flexible prices would 
instantaneously and continuously clear all markets, for products, labor, 
and financial instruments. No involuntary unemployment could ever 
arise, no undesired excess capacity, no gap between actual and poten 
tial GNP.
The formal story is that the Walrasian Auctioneer receives all the 
multicommodity supply and demand schedules of the agents, including 
those of the monetary authority and other policy makers. These schedules 
refer to intertemporal as well as contemporaneous contracts and tran 
sactions. The Auctioneer, presumably using a super-computer yet to 
be designed and built, solves the equation system, generates the market- 
clearing price vector, and informs the participating agents of the tran 
sactions they have made at those prices. The next day, or the next hour, 
or really the next microsecond, the awesome feat is performed anew.
In this interpretation, flexibility of prices in response to shocks, and 
in response to news, occurs instantaneously. Prices jump to their new 
market-clearing values discontinuously, without the passage of clock 
time. A graph of a price time series would show discontinuities. This is 
certainly not what is meant by flexibility in common parlance. And 
it certainly does not take anything like rigidity in the common meaning 
of that word to believe that demand shocks will cause output to deviate, 
at least temporarily, from the "AS" schedule.
Anyway, if imperfect or monopolistic competition is assumed, rather 
than Walrasian pure competition, a Walrasian Auctioneer solution would 
not even exist.
Fifty years ago, no economists denied that demand shocks could at 
least temporarily affect output, in individual markets and in the economy 
at large. Keynes did not regard this possibility as problematic, and neither 
did his "classical" opponents. No one took the continuous competitive 
multimarket-clearing scenario as anything but an illustrative demonstra 
tion that in principle the system was self-consistent and solvable. As
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Joseph Schumpeter, a great economist at whose feet I sat, put it, Walras's 
theory was the magna charta of economists, giving us the license to 
proceed in the knowledge that our quest for coherence was not a fruitless 
one. It was the beginning of the search, not the end. It was not then, 
as it seems to be now in theoretical circles, a point of reference from 
which any alleged departure bears the burden of proof. That is a Panglos- 
sian presumption, biasing our profession to the view that free markets 
are the best of all possible worlds.
Fifty years ago, and earlier, price theorists worried about false trading. 
Walras and Marshall envisaged temporary disequilibria in individual 
markets. Prevailing prices do not always clear the markets. They 
postulated dynamic rules of price adjustment (Walras) or quantity ad 
justment (Marshall) that would normally, but not invariably, bring supply 
and demand together. Stability of general multimarket equilibrium was 
especially problematic. "False trading" was recognized as a possible 
source of prolonged disequilibrium. Trades made at nonmarket-clearing 
prices change the endowments of the market participants, and thus alter 
their supply and demand schedules. A fashionable current term for ef 
fects of this kind is "hysteresis," a generic name for situations in which 
the nature of a system's equilibrium is not independent of the path the 
system takes when it is out of equilibrium. These problems have not 
been solved by later generations of theorists. They have simply been 
ignored, and replaced by firmer reliance on the great Auctioneer.
False trading and similar phenomena make it difficult for agents to 
learn the structure of the markets in which they are participating ac 
curately enough to form rational expectations. The observations 
generated by disequilibria cannot teach the participants the equilibrium 
structure. Imagine a group of non-English-speaking foreigners from all 
over the world trying to learn English simply by conversing with each 
other.
Fifty years ago, the macroeconomic disagreement between Keyne- 
sians and classicals concerned this point. A shock occurs and takes the 
economy away from equilibrium. Unemployment arises, Keynesian in 
voluntary unemployment. Would endogenous movements of prices and 
other macroeconomic variables return the economy to the equilibrium
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from which it was jarred? Does the capitalist-market economy have 
reliable and quick mechanisms of adjustment?
The classical economists thought there were effective stabilizers. 
Keynes thought there were not. Sometimes, on some pages, he argued 
that there were none at all. In Book I of his General Theory, he en 
visages a whole family of equilibria, not just the classical full- 
employment equilibrium, but many aggregate demand equilibria with 
involuntary unemployment, equilibria not escaped or escapable by ad 
justments of prices. This indeed is the meaning of "general" in his 
title. Although he modifies his opening statement of his theory in later 
chapters, particularly chapter 19, his overall theme stands: the natural 
endogenous adjustment mechanisms cannot be counted on. That is why 
Keynes regarded macroeconomic interventions by government as 
essential.
The question, as Keynes saw it, was whether reductions in wages 
and prices would increase aggregate demand, and thus take the economy 
to full-employment equilibrium. His answer contained two strands. First, 
nominal wages would not fall rapidly in response to excess supply of 
labor. This strand is the one that sticks in the memory of the profes 
sion, exaggerated into assumed wage or price rigidity. Second, even 
if wages, and with them prices, were flexible, deflation would not in 
crease aggregate demand and eliminate unemployment and underutiliza- 
tion of capital. This is the stand the profession has forgotten or neglected.
The Origins of Wage Stickiness in Keynesian Theory
I will say something about the first strand, although it is not my cen 
tral topic here. It is routinely and unquestioningly supposed that Keynes 
attributed "money illusion" to workers. Neoclassical theorists therefore 
dismiss Keynesian theory out of hand. Often Keynesians accede to the 
charge but defend it on grounds of realism. I have come to believe that 
Keynes's argument is free of the taint. And although it is not logically 
tight, it can be made so. Let me explain.
You will recall that Keynes's workers were willing to accept a cut 
in real wages achieved by an increase in the price of wage goods. Yet 
they were not willing to take a cut in money wages. Keynes's reason
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for this asymmetry is theoretically impeccable and at the same time 
realistic. Workers are concerned primarily with relative wages, with 
how their pay compares with those to whom they regard themselves 
at least equal in merit. Labor markets are disaggregated and desyn- 
chronized. To any single worker or local group, a nominal wage cut 
appears to be a loss in relative wages; there is no assurance that others 
will also take cuts. On the other hand, an increase in the cost of living 
is the same for everybody. Workers may be perfectly prepared to receive 
lower real wages with unchanged relative wages, but labor market in 
stitutions give them no way to communicate this willingness.
That real wages are too high is the time-worn orthodox explanation 
of unemployment. If labor unions or government regulations keep them 
too high, unemployment is classical, not amenable to remedy by de 
mand expansion. There is an identification problem, because the same 
observable symptoms are consistent with different causes. Keynes agreed 
that it is likely that real wages are in depressions above their full employ 
ment values. But, he argued, that is not the same thing as saying they 
are rigid at their high depression values. Just try expanding demand, 
and you will see that profit margins can be expanded and real wages 
reduced as necessary to make higher employment profitable to 
employers.
As I observed above, recovery may not require lowering of real wages. 
But it is still true that the way to get higher employment is to raise ag 
gregate demand, at the same time as money wages are stuck because 
of concerns for relative wage parity. Those concerns do not depend 
on money illusion. They are certainly not irrational. They are very 
human, and there is a great deal of empirical evidence of their 
importance.
The hole in the story in the General Theory is that it doesn't explain 
how the concerns of employed workers prevail when there are 
unemployed workers willing to work for less pay real, nominal, or 
relative. The power of insiders vis-a-vis employers and outsiders evident 
ly derives from the costs of turnover among members of an interdepen 
dent working team. Insider power is rightly the subject of considerable 
theoretical and empirical inquiry right now, for example by Assar Lind-
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beck and his colleagues in Stockholm. Labor economists have long 
observed that queues of jobseekers outside the factory gate have little 
effect on the wages paid to employees inside. Hard times do bring wage 
cuts, but generally through so damaging the financial and competitive 
positions of employers that they can credibly threaten layoffs of senior 
workers and even plant closings and bankruptcies.
Keynes did not squarely face the fact that the realistic descriptions 
of labor markets in his own argument were inconsistent with his assump 
tion of pure competition in all markets. Wages are administered or 
negotiated prices. They are not set in impersonal auction markets. The 
same is true, of course, of product prices. Keynes did recognize that 
his theory applies to economies where the wages administered or 
negotiated are money wages. Things would be quite different with com 
plete indexation.
The Weakness or Perversity of Price Effects on Aggregate Demand
The second strand in Keynes's basic argument was this: Even if money 
wages and prices were flexible, even if excess supplies of labor led to 
cuts in money wages, this flexibility would not prevent unemployment. 
Given a contractionary shock in aggregate demand, deflation of money 
wages and prices would not restore real demand to its full employment 
value. The classical market-clearing adjustment mechanism was, in 
Keynes's view, much too frail to bear the weight of macroeconomic 
stabilization. In fact, Keynes recommended stability rather than flex 
ibility in money wages.
Two issues in this debate need to be distinguished. The first concerns 
the relation of real aggregate demand to the price level. The second 
concerns its relation to the expected rate of change of prices. In discussing 
them, I shall not distinguish between money wages and prices and their 
rates of change, but rather follow the assumption, conventional in this 
debate, that they move together. I remind you that the theoretical argu 
ment refers to a closed economy. You could think of the United States 
in years gone by, or of post-1992 Europe, or of the whole OECD area.
Keynes in Book I denied that real aggregate demand was related at 
all to the price and money wage level. In effect he turned the classical
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neutrality proposition against the classicals. If all money wages and prices 
are lowered in the same proportion, how can real quantities demanded 
be any different? Thus if a real shock makes real demand deficient, 
how can a purely nominal price adjustment undo the damage? Actual 
ly, Keynes himself provided an answer in chapter 19. If the nominal 
quantity of money remains the same, its real quantity increases, interest 
rates fall, and real demand increases. This scenario is often called the 
"Keynes effect." This mechanism would fail if demand for money 
became perfectly elastic with respect to interest rates the famous 
liquidity trap or if demand for goods for consumption and investment 
were perfectly inelastic.
Pigou and other authors provided another scenario, the "Pigou ef 
fect" or "real balance effect," which alleges a direct effect of increas 
ed wealth, in the case at hand taking the form of the increased real value 
of base money, on real consumption demand (possibly also on invest 
ment demand). This does not depend on reduction of interest rates.
The theoretical fraternity has taken the Pigou effect as a decisive refuta 
tion of Keynes's claim to have found underemployment equilibria. As 
long as involuntary unemployment and excess capacity push wages and 
prices down, there will be an equilibrium when and only when they 
reach so low a level that monetary wealth is so great that aggregate 
demand creates jobs for all willing workers.
The Pigou effect is of dubious strength, and even of uncertain sign. 
Most nominal assets in a modern economy are "inside" assets, that 
is, the debts of private agents to other private agents. They wash out 
in accounting aggregation, leaving only the government's nominal debt 
to the private sector as new wealth. Some, if not all, of that debt is 
internalized by taxpayers. The base of the real balance effect is therefore 
quite small relative to the economy in the United States the monetary 
base is only 6 percent of GNP.
That inside assets and debts wash out in accounting aggregation does 
not mean that the effects of price changes on their real value wash out. 
Price declines make creditors better off and debtors poorer. Their 
marginal propensities to spend from wealth need not be the same. Com 
mon sense suggests that debtors would have the higher spending pro 
pensities; that is why they are in debt. Such a differential could easily
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swamp the Pigou effect. We're talking about gross amounts of 200 per 
cent of GNP. I like to call this reverse Pigou effect a Fisher effect, 
because Irving Fisher emphasized the increased burden of debt resulting 
from (unanticipated) deflation as a major factor in depressions in general 
and in the Great Depression in particular. It is quite possible that this 
Fisher effect is stronger than the Pigou and Keynes effects combined, 
particularly when output and employment are low relative to capacity. 2
The argument I have just made refers to levels of nominal wages and 
prices. An even more important argument refers to rates of change. 
The Keynes and Pigou effects compare high prices and low as if they 
were timeless alternatives, without worrying about the process of change 
from high to low in real time. Economists of the day argued in this 
way quite consciously, as required by the rules of the comparative statics 
game they were playing. The process of change works on aggregate 
demand in just the wrong direction. Greater expected deflation, or ex 
pected disinflation, is an increase in the real rate of interest, necessari 
ly so when nominal interest rates are constrained by the zero floor of 
the interest on money. Here is another Fisher effect, another factor Fisher 
stressed in explanation of the Great Depression. Keynes stressed it too, 
as a pragmatic dynamic reinforcement of the lesson of his static general 
theory.
He was right to do so. In a 1975 article3 I exhibited a simple 
macroeconomic system, classical in the sense that it has only one 
equilibrium, characterized by full employment, indeed by a "natural*' 
rate of unemployment. Given the monetary base, the price level is stable 
in that equilibrium. The dynamic stability of the system depends on the 
relative strengths of the real balance effect and the real interest effect. 
If the real interest effect dominates, as it well may if the real balance 
effect is weak and certainly will if the Fisher debt burden effect prevails, 
then the equilibrium is unstable. Moreover, the system could be stable 
locally but unstable for large displacements.
I regarded my article as supporting Keynes's intuition that price and 
wage flexibility are bad for real stability. I wanted to shake the profes 
sion off its conventional interpretation of Keynesian economics, accord 
ing to which unemployment arises only because of a dubious asser-
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tion of wage and price rigidity. I wanted to recall and reinforce the sec 
ond strand of Keynes's argument, according to which unemployment 
is attributable to inadequate real demand, a deficiency that flexibility 
will not remedy. That is also what I am hoping to do here.
I am quite willing to subscribe to a meaning of equilibrium that ex 
cludes involuntary unemployment, and to characterize depressions as 
disequilibria. Either way, the Keynesian diagnosis and prescription are 
the same in practice.
Recently, at long last, the question whether price flexibility (in any 
sense short of the Walrasian Auctioneer fairy tale) is stabilizing has 
begun to receive serious attention. DeLong and Summers4 have in 
vestigated it in the Taylor staggered-contract model, amended to allow 
price-level and price-change effects on demand. The Taylor model results 
in unemployment when there are new circumstances and information, 
because wages and prices cannot be immediately adjusted to them. It 
also allows Keynesian policies to work temporarily, because the 
authorities can react to new circumstances and information before ex 
isting contracts are renegotiated.
DeLong and Summers simulate increased flexibility by making the 
periods in the staggered-contract model shorter. They find that increased 
flexibility in this sense frequently does make real outcomes, employ 
ment and output, more volatile, not less. The reason is the same as in 
my model, the Fisher real interest rate effect of inflation and deflation. 
Their most interesting simulation has the intuitively desirable result that 
in the limit perfect price flexibility instantaneous jumps of the Walra 
sian solution in response to shocks does stabilize real variables perfect 
ly. Close to this limit, greater price flexibility means greater real stability, 
but farther away from it, the reverse is true.
Nominal and Real Demand Shocks
I began by calling your attention to the caricature of the Keynesian 
theory of business fluctuations all too generally accepted in the profes 
sion. According to that caricature, fluctuations in real output and employ 
ment arise from shocks to nominal aggregate demand, which become 
real shocks only because prices are rigid. Tides ebb and flow; they matter 
to boats only because they pass over rocks.
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Keynesian theory of business fluctuations stresses shocks to real ag 
gregate demand investment, consumption, or government purchases. 
Some impulses may indeed come from the monetary side, but that does 
not make them purely nominal. A monetary policy action that lowers 
nominal interest rates also lowers real rates and affects investment de 
mand. Likewise, a shift in production functions that raises the marginal 
productivity of capital stimulates investment and diminishes the demand 
for money at the same time. The world is not constructed in the 
dichotomous way assumed in the common classification of shocks as 
either nominal or real.
The great achievement of the General Theory is the theory of effec 
tive demand. Keynes's insight was that demand is constrained by amounts 
actually sold in markets, which may frequently be less than the amounts 
agents would like to sell at existing prices. This was a deeper insight 
than the assertion that nominal wages and prices are "rigid." I com 
mend it to the New Keynesians as a more fruitful and important line 
of inquiry than the macroeconomic role of the real costs of changing 
nominal prices on menus, price lists, and catalogs.
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I. Introduction
In this essay, I was asked to assess the state of economic science, 
necessarily from my own personal perspective, which is perhaps less 
representative of median or mainstream evaluation than those perspec 
tives that may be offered by my peers in this series.* I shall make no 
attempt to be comprehensive here, although the implications of my whole 
argument for the economist's stance as both a positive and normative 
scientist involve major shifts in attitudes toward the disciplinary sub 
ject matter. I shall concentrate discussion on my understanding of what 
an economy is, from which inferential criticisms of research programs, 
didactic instruction, and policy implementation emerge, more or less 
as a matter of course.
I may succeed in attracting your attention by stating two of these 
criticisms boldly at the outset. First, there is no place for 
macroeconomics, either as a part of our positive science or as a realm 
for policy action. Second, the appropriate mathematics is game theory
am indebted to my colleague, Viktor Vanberg, for helpful comments on an earlier draft
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rather than maximization of objective functions subject to constraints. 
These apparently unrelated criticisms emerge from understanding and 
interpreting the economy nonteleologically, as an order, rather than 
understanding-interpreting the economy Ideologically, as an institutional 
arrangement that is to be evaluated in terms of relative success or failure 
to achieve assigned system-defined objectives. Were I to have a subti 
tle for this essay, it would be "The Economy as a Constitutional Order." 
I would append the word "constitutional" to the word "order" so as 
to indicate that my perspective differs both from those evolutionists who 
do emphasize the economy as an order but who, at the same time, deny 
that such an order can be "constituted," and from those who fail to 
make the distinction between constitutional and post-constitutional levels 
of choice.
Before proceeding, let me also classify myself philosophically. I am 
a methodological and normative individualist, a radical subjectivist, a 
contractarian, and a constitutionalist. These descriptive attributes are 
familiar to those of you who may have been exposed variously to my 
published works over four decades. In a very real sense, these works 
are little more than my continuing and considered assessment of the 
state of economics or political economy. I have always been, and re 
main, an outsider, whose efforts have been devoted to changing the 
direction of the disciplinary research program. There is perhaps less 
reason for me to take a reflective look at where we are scientifically 
than there is for those of my peers who have remained inside the domi 
nant research program that describes what economists do. You would 
scarcely expect me to take on some new colors at this stage, and I assure 
you that there has been no recent conversion to a new paradigm. No 
one has had, or will have, occasion to label me as a holder of the con 
ventional wisdom.
I shall proceed as follows. Section II examines the relationships be 
tween scarcity, choice, and value maximization within the domain of 
economics as scientific inquiry. My aim in this section is to demonstrate 
how these concepts, by having been placed in too central a role, have 
generated intellectual confusion. Section in extends the perspective to 
examine the appropriateness of macroeconomics in the subject matter
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domain of our discipline. Section IV briefly treats the grand organiza 
tional alternatives and develops the notion that the conception of what 
the economy is does have normative implications. Section V compares 
and contrasts the two approaches in terms of the shift from individual 
to social choice. Finally, in Section VI, the argument is summarized.
II. Scarcity, Choice, and the Maximization of Value
I do not know what the 1989 instructors in economics tell their students 
about the content of the discipline. Perhaps they simply ignore defini 
tional starting points. But I do recall that, in the 1940s, economic theory 
(price theory) courses commenced with something like Milton Fried- 
man's statement (1962) to the effect that economics is the study of how 
a particular society solves its economic problem. And, at least in the 
1940s, everyone knew that "the economic problem" was defined by 
Lionel Robbins (1932) as the allocation of scarce resources among alter 
native ends. Scarcity, the inability to meet all demands, implies that 
choices must be made, from which it seems to follow directly that a 
criterion for "better" and "worse" choices is required. This criterion 
emerges as some common denominator that allows the differing demands 
to be translated into a single dimension, which we then label as "utili 
ty" or "value." The "economic principle" offers the abstractly defined 
normative solution to the economic problem. Scarce resources are 
allocated among alternative uses so as to secure maximum value when 
a unit of each scarce resource yields equivalent value in each use to 
which it is put. Satisfying this norm maximizes value subject to the 
resource scarcity constraints. Economics, as a realm for scientific in 
quiry, does indeed seem to be reducible to applied maximization; the 
calculus seems surely to be its basic mathematics.
I want to suggest here that this economics, which is the economics 
that I learned both as a student and as a young professional, generates 
intellectual confusion and misunderstanding because it focuses atten 
tion inappropriately on scarcity, on choice, and on value maximiza 
tion, while shifting attention away from the institutional structure of 
an economy, with the consequent failure to make elementary distinc-
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tions among alternative structures. Given the dominance of the Rob- 
bins formulation in the economic theory of mid-century, it is not sur 
prising that market solutions were often modeled as analogous to plan 
ning solutions to the resource allocation problem. Economists proceeded 
as if "the market" embodies "social choices" among alternative alloca 
tions of resources, choices that may be compared with those that might 
emerge from the monolithic decisions of a single planner. Given the 
mind-set of mid-century, it is also not surprising that Arrow (1951) ex 
tended his impossibility theorem to the market as well as to political choice.
As early as 1963, in my presidential address to the Southern Economic 
Association (1964), I criticized the central role assigned to the max 
imizing paradigm in economics, and I called for a revival of "catallac- 
tics" (or "catallaxy") as the core of our discipline. My argument was 
that economics, as a social science, is or should be about trade, ex 
change, and the many and varied institutional forms that implement and 
facilitate trade, including all of the complexities of modern contracts 
as well as the whole realm of collective agreement on the constitutional 
rules of political society.
In a basic conceptual sense, the exchange process remains categorically 
different from the choosing process. In exchange, there is a necessary 
interaction between (among) separate actors (participants), no one of 
which can choose among "solutions." In exchange, each participant 
does, of course, make choices among alternative bids and offers 
(strategies). But these choices of any single participant are, at most, 
only a part of the interaction process. A solution to an exchange emerges 
only from the choices made, separately and independently, by all par 
ticipants in the process. This solution, as such, is not explicitly chosen 
by any one of the participants, or by the set of participants organized 
as a collective entity. This solution is simply not within the choice set 
of either individual actors or the collectivity.
This elementary sketch of exchange provides the basis for my early 
assertion that game theory offers the appropriate mathematical 
framework that facilitates an abstract understanding of economics. In 
exchange, as in ordinary games, players or participants may be model 
ed as behaving so as to maximize their separately defined utilities, sub-
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ject to the constraints separately faced, as defined by the rules, the en 
dowments, and the predicted responses of other participants. The stan 
dard maximizing behavior embodied in rational choice models may, 
of course, be accepted for this analytical exercise. But, in exchange, 
again as in ordinary games, neither any single player-participant nor 
the set of players-participants, as a group, treats the outcome of the 
process as a maximand. The solution to the exchange process, simple 
or complex, is not the solution of a maximization problem, and to model 
it as such is the continuing source of major intellectual confusion in 
the whole discipline.
Equilibrium in any exchange interaction signals the exhaustion of the 
mutual gains, and this solution, as such, has behavioral properties that 
also describe positions of maxima for all choices. At equilibrium, no 
participant has an incentive to make further bids (offers) within the rules 
that define the structure of the interaction. In the equilibrium of the 
ideally competitive economy, there is no incentive, either for any single 
participant, or for any group of participants, including the all-inclusive 
group, to modify the results within the rules. 1 But what is maximized 
in this solution to the competitive "game"? That which is maximized, 
in any sense at all meaningful for behavior, is the value for each par 
ticipant, as determined separately and subjectively, subject to the en 
dowments initially possessed and to the expressed preferences of others 
in the nexus, as reflected in the bids (offers) made in markets. There 
is no "social" or "collective" value maximization, as such, in the ex 
change process, even in some idealized sense. Aggregative value, 
measured in some numeraire, is, of course, at a maximum in the solu 
tion, but this is a definitional consequence of the equilibrium. The relative 
prices of goods and services are themselves determined in the process 
of attaining the equilibrium, and it is only when these emergent prices 
are used that any maximum value, as an aggregate, can be defined.
Since an abstractly defined maximum for aggregative value cannot 
exist independently of the market process through which it is achiev 
ed, it is meaningless to refer to a shortfall in aggregative value, as such, 
except as some indirect identification of failure to exhaust gains from 
trade among participants somewhere in the nexus. Since participants
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are presumed able to make their own within-exchange choices, the 
political economist's hypotheses that value is not being maximized must 
be derived from observations that there exist impediments to the trading 
process (Buchanan 1959, 1988), whether at the simple level of buyer- 
seller exchange or at the level of all-inclusive complex "exchanges" 
in public goods. The observing political economist is unable, even con 
ceptually, to construct a "social welfare function" that will allow him 
to carry out a maximization exercise analogous to that which the plan 
ner for a centralized economy must undertake. For such a planner, his 
choices are analogous, even if at a different dimension of complexity, 
to those faced by any single participant in the exchange nexus.
III. Macroeconomics and Constitutional Political Economy
The basic and elementary distinction between the maximizing and 
the exchange paradigms supports the proposition advanced earlier con 
cerning the suggested exclusion of macroeconomics from the domain 
of our disciplinary subject matter, at least macroeconomics as normal 
ly defined. That which is generated in the economic interaction pro 
cess, whether or not represented as a formalized, abstractly defined 
equilibrium or solution, emerges from the separate and interdependent 
choices made by many participants, choices that are coordinated, whether 
efficaciously or not, through the institutional arrangements that define 
the economic structure. The economy wide aggregated variables, such 
as national income or product, rates of employment, capacity utiliza 
tion, or growth, are not variables subject to choice, either directly or 
indirectly, by individual participants in the economy or by political agents 
who may presume to act on behalf of all participants as a collectivity, 
or any subset thereof.
It is intellectually confusing even to model "the economy" as if its 
normative purpose is one of maximizing income and/or employment, 
or, indeed, as if 'the economy' has normative purpose at all. As noted 
earlier, any failure of the interaction process to generate maximum value 
must reflect failure to exploit gains from trade, whether simple or com 
plex. This putative diagnosis calls attention to the structure itself which
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may contain constraints that prevent the consummation of mutually ad 
vantageous trades.
Alternative structures are, of course, to be evaluated indirectly by 
observations of the patterns of results generated, and these results may 
be represented in terms of the familiar macroaggregated variables such 
as the level and growth of national product or employment. An economy 
that persistently generates wide swings in levels of income and employ 
ment would, appropriately, be deemed to be a structural failure, and 
such a pattern of results should offer incentives to investigate, locate, 
and identify the structural sources of the problem, leading ultimately 
to structural-institutional reform.
The tragic flaw in Keynesian-inspired macroeconomics lies in its ac 
ceptance, and, hence, neglect, of structure while concentrating almost 
exclusive attention on the prospects and potential for "guiding" the 
economy toward more satisfactory target levels of the aggregative 
variables. It is not at all surprising, when viewed in retrospect, that 
this monumental misdirection of scientific effort should have occurred, 
given the dominance of the maximizing paradigm during the critical 
years of mid-century. There was a general failure to recognize that the 
whole intellectual construction is inconsistent with a structure that allows 
for the independent choice behavior of many participants in the economic 
nexus. As Keynes himself recognized in his preface to the German 
translation of his book, the whole reinterpretation of the economic pro 
cess in a normatively directed ideological model was more applicable 
to an authoritarian regime than to a democratic one.
I do not want to suggest, however, that the classical economists, at 
least those who were the targets of Keynes's direct criticism, were free 
of their own peculiar sort of blindness that led them, also, to neglect 
structural elements. In their implied presumption that results embody 
ing satisfactory levels of the aggregative variables would emerge, in 
dependently of possible structural failures, these economists were ill- 
prepared to defend the discipline against the emotionally driven zealots 
for macroeconomic management.
The intellectual, scientific and policy scenario should have been, and 
could have been, so different in those critical decades before mid-century.
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Little was really needed beyond an elementary recognition that the 
economic process functions well only within a legal-constitutional struc 
ture that embodies predictability in the value of the monetary unit, ac 
companied by a regime reform that would have been designed to 
guarantee such predictability. (In this respect alone, a unique window 
of opportunity was missed in the 1930s.) Macroeconomic theory, in 
both its lower and its higher reaches, need not have been born at all, 
along with the whole industry.that designs, constructs and operates the 
large macroeconomic models. 2
IV. Socialism, Laissez Faire, Interventionist!!, 
and the Structure of an Economy
It is now widely acknowledged, both in theory and in practice, that 
socialism was (is) a failure. The socialist god is dead; the promise that 
was once associated with socialism, as an overarching principle for social 
organization, no longer exists. The romantic image of the state as an 
omniscient and benevolent entity, an image that had been around since 
Hegel, was shattered by the simple observation that those who act on 
behalf of the state are also ordinary humans, like the rest of us, who 
respond to standard incentives within the limited informational setting 
they confront. Centralized economic planning, with state ownership and 
control over means of production, has entered history as intellectual 
folly, despite the record of its having attracted the attention of so many 
brilliant minds in the first half of this century, and also despite the awful 
realization that efforts to implement this folly involved the needless 
sacrifice of millions of lives.
At the opposing end to socialism on the imagined ideological spec 
trum stands the equally romantic ideal of laissez faire, the fictional im 
age of the anarcho-capitalists, in which there is no role for the state 
at all. In this model, freely choosing individuals, who have somehow 
costlessly escaped from the Hobbesian jungle, will create and maintain 
markets in all goods and services, including the market for protection 
of person and possessions. It is as difficult to think systematically about 
this society as it is to think of that society peopled by the "new men"
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of idealized communism. Robert Nozick's derivation (1974) of the 
minimally coercive state was surely convincing even to those stubborn 
minds who held onto the laissez-faire dream.
Any plausibly realistic analysis of social order, whether positive or 
normative, must be bounded by the limits set by these ideological ex 
tremes. The state is neither omniscient nor benevolent, but a political- 
legal framework is an essential element in any functioning order of 
human interaction. The analysis, discussion, and debate then centers 
on the degree or extent of political control over and intervention into 
the interaction process. The extended interventionist state remains a 
viable alternative in the ongoing political argument and proponents for 
such a state are found among scientists and citizens alike, and despite 
the general loss of faith in the socialist ideal. Opposed to the extended 
interventionist polity lies the minimal or protective state, tempered 
variously by acknowledgment of the appropriateness of both produc 
tive and transfer state elements. 3
Questions may be raised at this point concerning how these issues 
relate to my evaluation of the state of economic science, which was, 
after all, my assigned task for this essay. I return to my central theme. 
My hypothesis is that the basic conceptualization of what' 'an economy" 
or "the economy" is, the paradigmatic vision of what it is that we are 
inquiring into and about, does, indeed, carry direct normative implica 
tions. In a real sense, my hypothesis suggests that divergent normative 
stances may reflect divergent understandings rather than differing 
ultimate values. If this hypothesis is descriptively accurate, genuine scien 
tific progress may be made at the level of fundamental understanding 
(methodology) as well as at the apparent cutting edges of some presumed 
invariant empirical reality. 4
Applied somewhat more narrowly, my hypothesis is that the nor- 
matively preferred scope for state or collective intervention will de 
pend directly upon the conceptualization of what the economy is, as 
the subject for scientific inquiry. That is to say, the normative debate 
on the turf bounded between the socialist and the laissez-faire extremes 
will reflect the divergent models of the observed reality. In a certain 
sense, the ought is derived from the presumed is.
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Let me try to be more specific. I suggest that an accepted understand 
ing of the economy as an order of interaction constrained within a set 
of rules or constraints, leads more or less directly to a normatively prefer 
red minimal intervention with the results of such interaction. By com 
parison and by contrast, an accepted understanding of the economy as 
an engine, mechanism, or means, organized for the achievement of 
specifically defined purposes, leads more or less directly to a normatively 
preferred stance of expediency in evaluating possible state or collec 
tive intervention with the interaction process.
Many textbooks commence with a discussion of the functions of an 
economy, as introduced by Frank H. Knight (1934). I have suggested 
(1988) that even so much as a listing of "functions" for an economy 
may generate confusion and misunderstanding. If the economy, as such, 
is without purpose, how can we attribute functions to its operation? The 
economy-as-order conceptualization forces us to restrict evaluation to 
the relative success of the structure in facilitating the accomplishment 
of whatever it is that the separately interacting participants may seek. 
(Again, the basic game analogy is useful. We evaluate the rules that 
describe a game by assessing how successful these rules are in allow 
ing players to achieve those objectives they seek in playing.)
The point here may be made emphatically in the simple example of 
two-person, two-good exchange. Two traders are presumed to hold en 
dowments in two goods, and these endowments are assumed to be 
mutually acknowledged to be owned by the initial holders. The traders 
are observed to engage in exchange, and a post-trade distribution of 
endowments different from the pre-trade distribution emerges. How do 
observing economists evaluate this simple exchange process? The two 
interpretations or understandings involve quite different exercises. The 
mechanistic, functionalist, Ideological understanding introduces a 
presumed prior knowledge of individual utility or preference orderings, 
and the post-trade positions are compared with the pre-trade positions, 
for each trader. If the comparisons indicate that each trader has moved 
to a higher level of utility, the exchange is judged to have been mutual 
ly utility-enhancing.
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The economy-as-order understanding proceeds quite differently. The 
economist does not call upon some presumed prior knowledge of the 
utility or preference functions of the two traders to be able to conclude 
that the exchange has been utility-enhancing for each trader. He does 
not evaluate the results of exchange Ideologically against some previous 
ly defined and known scalar. Instead, he adjudges the exchange to have 
been utility-enhancing for each trader to the extent that the process itself 
has embodied attributes of fairness and propriety. If there has been 
neither force nor fraud, and if the exchange has been voluntary on the 
part of both traders, it is classified to have been mutually beneficial. 
When the economist analyzes the behavior of the traders in entering 
into and agreeing on terms of exchange, he may, if desired, use the 
language of utility maximization, provided that the exclusive emphasis 
is placed on individuals' behavior in maximizing their separately iden 
tified utilities, which are not observable independently.
Important implications for potential intervention in voluntary ex 
changes stem from the contrasting interpretations here. If the economist 
bases his evaluation on the relative success of the exchange in moving 
the traders higher on an independently existing utility scalar, he may 
be led to recommend intervention even in the absence of observation 
of force, fraud, or coercion in the exchange process itself. This ap 
proach provides the basis for paternalistic, merit-goods arguments for 
collective interferences with voluntary market exchanges. The individual 
may not act so as to maximize his own utility. On the other hand, if 
the observing economist bases his evaluation exclusively on the pro 
cess of the exchange itself, recommendations for collective interven 
tion must be limited to proposals for removing barriers to trade inclusive 
ly defined.
We can remain with the simple exchange example to discuss the role 
of agreement in the two interpretations-understandings of economic in 
teraction, along with the place of the Pareto criterion in any evaluative 
exercise. Exchange involves agreement on the part of traders, both upon 
entry into trade and upon terms of trade. The emergence of a post- 
exchange distribution of goods signals an equilibrium of sorts. The 
Ideological interpretation of exchange does not call upon agreement
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for any critical purpose. The dual criteria are the separate utility scalars 
of our two traders, presumed known to the assessor prior to trade. If 
exchange moves each trader higher on the scalar assigned to him, the 
change is defined to have been Pareto superior. The welfare assess 
ment can be positive without any necessary resort to interpersonal utility 
comparisons.
By contrast, the economy-as-order interpretation depends critically 
upon agreement as the criterion for assessment. Since there are no in 
dependently existent scalars, the only indication that traders have im 
proved their position lies in their observed agreement. A positive welfare 
assessment becomes possible because the agreement has signaled mutual 
ly preferred change. Agreement is the means of defining Pareto 
(Wicksell) superiority, and it is the only means that exists.
V. From Individual to Social Choice: Utilitarian 
Versus Contractarian Foundations
The economist who conceptualizes the economy as a potential welfare- 
generating mechanism or instrument may be unwilling to limit criteria 
of evaluation to separately imputed, individually identified scalars. 
Almost by necessity, and despite the acknowledged insupportability of 
a simplistic utilitarianism, some attempt will be made to derive mean 
ingful measures for "social" or "collective" utility. This is the essen 
tial thrust behind the invention-elaboration-use of the social welfare func 
tion constructions in mid-century theoretical welfare economics, con 
structions that embodied both explicit introduction of ethical judgments 
and the relevance of the Pareto escape from direct interpersonal utility 
comparability. This whole exercise involved a search for a post-Robbins 
scalar against which the potential performance of the economy might 
be measured, a scalar that could be set up to exist independently of the 
performance itself. Success or failure of that which is evaluated, the 
economy or the market, is then determined from some comparison of 
observed results with those that might have been achieved. Modern 
economists who resorted to the social welfare function constructions, 
and despite all their methodological and philosophical sophistication,
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have really not succeeded in escaping from the utilitarian foundations 
from which the whole maximizing-allocationist paradigm emerged late 
in the nineteenth century.
If we shuck off the utilitarian trappings and simply abandon efforts 
to construct a scalar that will allow evaluation of performance for the 
economy or the market, as such, we are then forced into an acceptance 
of the alternative conceptualization advanced here, that of the economy 
as an order, or structure, or set of rules, the performance of which is 
not to be evaluated in terms of results that are conceptually divorced 
from the behavior of acting individuals within the order itself. Within 
the order or structure, individuals engage in trade. If we then generalize 
the trading interaction and extend its application over large numbers 
of actors, we may begin to explain, derive, and analyze social or political 
interdependence as complex exchange, as a relationship that embodies 
political voluntary agreement as an appropriate criterion of legitimation.
The contractarian tradition in political philosophy offers the intellec 
tual avenue that facilitates the shift of inquiry from simple market ex 
change engaged in by two traders to the intricacies of politics. Many 
critics balk at this extension. They may accept the centrality of volun 
tary exchange in economic process but remain unwilling to model politics 
in the exchange paradigm. By simple observation, so say such critics, 
politics is about conflict and coercion. How can we even begin to ex 
plain political reality by an exchange model?
The contractarian response requires a recognition of the distinction 
between the constitutional and the in-constitutional or post-constitutional 
levels of political interaction, a distinction without which any normative 
justification for political coercion could not exist, at least for the nor 
mative individualist. Conflict, coercion, zero-sum or negative sum rela 
tionships among persons these interactions do indeed characterize 
political institutions, as they may be observed to operate within a set 
of constitutional rules, that is, within a given constitutional order. The 
complex exchange model which embodies agreement among the many 
participants in the political "game" is clearly inapplicable here. But 
if analysis and attention are shifted to the level of rules, among which 
choices are possible, we can use potential and actual agreement among
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persons on these rules as the criterion for normative legitimacy. And 
such agreement way well produce rules, or sets of rules, that will operate 
so that, in particularized sequences of ordinary politics (single plays 
of the game) there may be negatively valued results for some of the 
participants (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).
Note that there is a more or less natural extension from the simple 
model of market exchange to the complex model of constitutional 
politics. There is no categorical distinction between the economic and 
the political process; inquiry in each case centers on the choice behavior 
of individuals who act, one with another, to choose rules that will, in 
turn, constrain their within-rule choices that will, in their turn, generate 
patterns of results. Note also, however, that this politics-as-complex- 
exchange derivation is not readily available to the economist who re 
mains trapped in the maximizing straight] acket.
VI. The Political Economy as a Constitutional Order
I fudged a bit earlier in this essay when I indicated that my subtitle 
for it would have been "The Economy as a Constitutional Order." It 
should now be clear from my discussion that I define the institutions 
of both the economy and the polity as belonging to an inclusive con 
stitutional order that we may designate as "the political economy." The 
political economy is described by the whole set of constraints, or struc 
ture, within which individuals act in furtherance of their own objectives.
Defined exclusively, these constraints include physical and 
technological limits, including those embodied in human capacities, that 
can be taken as invariant. These "absolutes" are beyond my range of 
interest, except to note that much of the folly of the socialist idea stemmed 
from a failure to recognize the relative immalleability of human be 
ings. My concern here, however, is with the set of constraints that are 
subject to deliberative change, and, hence, to choice. 5 Because these 
constraints are general and extend over all participants in the political 
economy, any choice must be, by definition, public, in the classic public 
good sense of this term. A shift in constraints for any one actor must 
apply for all actors.
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Let me now return to the distinction made earlier between the con 
stitutional and the in-constitutional levels of choice. Given any set of 
constraints, individuals will, separately and jointly, act in pursuit of 
their own interests and objectives. For some purposes, it is useful to 
take the existing constraints as a set of relatively absolute absolutes and 
to direct inquiry to predictions about the emergence of patterns of results. 
This domain of positive economics is productive, but it should not lead 
to the inference that these patterns of results can be modified to meet 
predetermined objectives, independently of any shift in the constraints 
themselves. Such effort must be paralleled by analyses aimed at predic 
ting results that will emerge under alternative constraints, other rules 
of the game, other constitutional structures. As I noted earlier, the 
tragedy of the Keynesian enterprise lay in its failed effort to modify 
aggregative results directly, due to its oversight of any prospects for 
institutional-constitutional change.
If the political economy is conceived as being described, in part, by 
constraints that can be subject to explicit collective choice, attention 
is immediately drawn to prospects for constitutional-institutional change. 
Once again the game analogy is helpful; we change a game by chang 
ing the rules, which will, in turn, modify the predicted pattern of out 
comes. If we diagnose the patterns of results observed to be less desired 
than alternative patterns deemed to be possible, it is incumbent on us, 
as political economists, to examine predicted results under alternative 
constraint structures. It is not legitimate to criticize, for example, an 
existing distribution of income of allocation of resources as being un 
just, inequitable, or inefficient, without being able, at the same time, 
to demonstrate some proposed alternative regime that can be expected 
to generate distributions or allocations that will do better by the same 
standards (Vining 1984; Usher 1981; Brennan and Buchanan 1985).
No one will, of course, be surprised that I have used the occasion 
of this essay to present a varied reiteration of the case for "constitu 
tional political economy" as the research program that should command 
the current attention of economists. As such, this research program in 
volves both positive and normative elements. Some critics have often 
accused me of skirting dangerously close to, if not actually commit-
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ting, the naturalistic fallacy, that of deriving the "ought" from the "is." 
I have never been concerned with such criticisms directly because, as 
noted earlier, in a certain sense we do derive 'oughts' from our con 
ceptions of what "is." The "is" that we take to be the economy does, 
indeed, have direct implications for how we ought to behave in our 
capacities as citizens who indirectly make collective choices among sets 
of rules. And let us be sure to understand that there is no "is" that 
is "out there" to the observing eye, ear, or skin. We create our 
understanding of the "is" by imposing an abstract structure on observed 
events. And it is this understanding that defines for us the effective limits 
of the feasible. It is dangerous nonsense to think that we do or can do 
otherwise.
NOTES
1. In slightly more formal terms, the competitive equilibrium is in the core of the game. This 
conclusion holds only if the rules of the game are strictly defined and enforced, and especially 
in relation to the incentives offered to potential monopolizing coalitions
2. Because of the near-universal failure of economists to look at structure, then and now, we 
face, in the 1990s, even more potential unpredictability in the value of the monetary units than 
we did in the 1920s. Given the inherent structural defect in our monetary regime, macroeconomic 
theorizing and the macro models may be useful, if for no other reason than that our discretionary 
monopolists of fiat issue may use such models for their own purposes The macro money game 
that we all must play is cumbersome, complex, and confusing It is sheer intellectual folly, joined 
with some jealousy for pseudo-scientific inquiry, to pretend that a regime shift could not produce 
dramatic increase in well-being for almost everyone
With predictability in the value of the monetary unit established (with any one of the several 
alternative regimes that might be the replacement for the discretionary authority in existence), 
economists could then get on with their appropriate social roles of analyzing the exchange pro 
cess in detail, with identifying barriers to the implementation of value-enhancing voluntary ex 
changes, with advancing hypotheses concerning changes in constraints that allow individuals to 
exploit more fully all potential for mutual gams
3. A cynical observer might suggest that little, if any, scientific progress has been made since 
1776, when Adam Smith first presented the antimercantilist argument from which modern economics 
emerged Mercantilism (protectionism, mterventiomsm) seems to have reemerged in the decades 
of the 1970s and 1980s in partial replacement for the acknowledged demise of socialism.
4. As my great professor, Frank H. Knight, once remarked at the end of an impressively presented 
empirical survey, "proving that water runs downhill," which expresses my own verdict on much 
of what I see in the now-dominant empirical emphasis of modern economic research I doubt 
if many economists are convinced by empirical evidence alone, although I acknowledge that the 
linkage between evidence and understanding remains mysterious
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5. I do not accept the implications of the analyses of some cultural evolutionists, who suggest 
that the basic institutions of social order evolve without conscious design and, by inference, sug 
gest also that deliberate improvement in these institutions may be impossible, and, further, that 
attempts at improvement are harmful
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The title of this volume of essays is "The State of Economic Science," 
but I should not like to limit myself to just describing where economics 
is now: I would like also to say something, however conjectural, about 
the future. Since, in contrast to Larry Klein, forecasting is not my pro 
fessional metier, perhaps I can avoid some of the dangers of amateurism 
by putting more emphasis on the prescriptive than on the predictive; 
by taking high moral ground and telling economics what it should be 
doing that it is not now doing.
Consensus and Dissention Among Economists
With this agenda, my emphasis will be on methodological issues: on 
what kinds of research economists should be doing and what tools they 
will need for doing it. But my methodological prescriptions need to derive 
from a view of the substance of economics and its problems, and should 
rest on an assessment of where economic science stands today. Let me 
begin with that.
Public Disagreement Among Economists
I must first explain why economists are seen by the general public 
to be constantly disagreeing with one another. Of course that is not
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wholly true with respect to my distinguished colleagues in this volume. 
I have observed that Ken Arrow, Larry Klein, Jim Tobin, and Bob Solow 
often agree even on public policy issues they may more often disagree 
with Jim Buchanan. But if Milton Friedman, or George Stigler, or Ted 
Schultz to mention just a few equally notable luminaries had hap 
pened to be present in this year's sample, the disagreement/agreement 
ratio would have increased quite sharply. And we could perhaps liven 
up the discussion even further by adding Bob Lucas or Sam Bowles. 
I have not even begun to exhaust the spectrum of policy views we can 
find within the economics profession.
Although you may have seen relatively little disagreement among the 
authors in this volume, the public is not mistaken in its perception that 
economists disagree frequently and vociferously. The fact of the mat 
ter is that, no matter what our views on matters of public policy, we 
can almost certainly find a relatively prominent economist to defend 
them; and this democratic indiscipline of the profession is well known 
to all readers of the daily press. We have Keynesian economics, 
monetarism, supply-side economics, rational expectations, and budget 
balancing, not to mention free trade, protection for infant industries, 
and proponents of the income tax, the single tax, the sales tax, and almost 
no taxes at all.
When national economic problems are under discussion, economists 
disagree as to whether to give priority to inflation, the public debt, 
employment, taxes, the trade balance, or the rate of interest. Clearly, 
these priorities have much to say about what policies economists will 
advocate. During the late seventies, there was a massive shift in primary 
concern from employment to inflation, but the shift was not unanimous 
and left the profession in as much disarray as before or more. Likewise, 
it is easy to start a lively argument about whether taxes should be rais 
ed in order to stem the rise in the national debt, or whether the burden 
of the national debt on the federal budget should be relieved by lower 
ing interest rates.
And finally, economists disagree about their forecasts for the economy 
over the coming months or years. We can almost always find optimists, 
pessimists, and flat-planers, although their relative numbers vary from
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time to time. Nor do these proportions much correlate with what the 
economy actually does. Economic forecasting is in low repute, often 
also among economists, who can even provide theoretical reasons why 
it should be impossible to predict the course of the business cycle or 
the stock market. The last recession saw a high casualty rate among 
economic forecasting units attached to business firms at a time of budget 
crunch, they were seen as dispensable.
With this cacophony of economic voices, it is not surprising that the 
status of economics as a science is sometimes challenged by a bemused 
public. Isn't a science supposed to provide accurate predictions about 
its phenomena? Is economics therefore not a science? We had best 
reserve our judgment a bit until I get on with my story. We are aware 
that meteorologists also disagree widely in their forecasts, but we would 
not doubt that meteorology is a science. For meteorologists have built 
a model of the atmospheric processes that is consistent with the basic, 
well-supported, laws of physics. Possessing such a model does not 
guarantee an ability to predict the future of the weather with any great 
accuracy.
In recent years, there has even been a very exciting development in 
the field of mathematics that suggests that certain complex systems 
(systems of nonlinear equations) may behave in a way that makes them 
inherently unpredictable. Such systems are called "chaotic," and their 
central characteristic is that a tiny displacement of their initial condi 
tions sometimes causes them to go off on completely divergent paths. 
We don't know whether the atmosphere is actually a chaotic system, 
but if it is, the wingbeats of a butterfly in Singapore may cause a tor 
nado in Chicago.
We also don't know whether the economy is a chaotic system. There 
are some statistical tests that can be applied to time series the money 
supply, or stock prices, or other economic series to distinguish be 
tween simple randomness and the kind of chaos and unpredictability 
I am describing here. Some attempts have been made recently by 
economists to test whether various economic time series are chaotic, 
but the results so far are inconclusive. (The September 1987 issue of 
the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Volume 8, Number
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3, which is devoted to the subject of chaos in dynamic economic systems, 
will provide the reader with a good introduction to the topic.) I men 
tion chaos to indicate that we should be wary of using prediction as 
a test of science, and especially of whether economics is a science, for 
an understanding of mechanisms does not guarantee predictability.
Private Agreement Among Economists
If it is well known that economists disagree, it is less well known 
to the general public, although perhaps not among economists, that there 
is a very high level of agreement among them. I will try to explain the 
apparent paradox and show why this is so. In spite of the disagreements 
I have enumerated, economists subscribe, nearly to a man and woman, 
to a common central core of theory, and above all, to a way of reason 
ing about economic questions. Before I state what the common core 
is, let me give an example of the kind of agreement that this communality 
produces.
Suppose that during a period of gasoline shortage, the govern 
ment issues ration tickets to the poor to guarantee them an 
adequate supply of gasoline at a moderate price. Should the 
law be written so that the poor may sell their ration tickets 
to others if they would prefer the money to the gasoline, or 
should such exchanges be prohibited by law?
When this question was presented to a national sample of lay per 
sons, about 80 percent replied that the exchange should be prohibited  
that the poor should be able to use the tickets only to purchase gasoline. 
When the same question was presented to a national sample of 
economists, virtually all responded that the exchange should be allowed.'
The reason economists are able to agree on this conclusion is that 
they apply to the problem a common set of assumptions and inference 
procedures. All (or nearly all) economists assume that every person 
is a utility maximizer: (1) possesses a consistent, comprehensive utili 
ty function that orders all the possible alternatives of choice, and (2) 
selects among alternatives so as to maximize subjective expected utili 
ty. "Subjective expected" means that the decisionmaker assigns (sub-
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jectively) probabilities to all possible outcomes of each available alter 
native, and averages the utilities of these outcomes, using the subjec 
tive probabilities as weights. Economists (nearly all economists) claim 
that people do behave so as to maximize utility, and that they ought 
to behave in this way, which they regard as uniquely rational.
Now in the rationing case, if the potential seller and buyer both agree 
on a price for the tickets, this must mean using the standard economic 
reasoning that each one thinks that his or her utility will be increased 
by the exchange. Hence, they will make the exchange if they are per 
mitted to, and they should be permitted to because then everyone will 
be better off. When certain other conditions are also satisfied, the ex 
change is said to produce a Pareto optimum, a situation that could not 
be altered in any way to produce an increase in utility for both par 
ticipants. Economists also refer to solutions of decision problems that 
are Pareto optimal as producing an efficient allocation of resources.
My account of the core of standard economic theory is, of course, 
something of an oversimplification. Many of the conclusions, particularly 
the normative ones, depend on the economic system being in a stable 
state of competitive equilibrium, and only under these conditions can 
a Pareto optimum guarantee an efficient allocation of resources. My 
simplified version, however, gives a clear enough picture of the nature 
of contemporary economic reasoning that is subscribed to by almost 
every school of thought.
Even Marx, in Das Kapital subscribes to this theory and this way 
of reasoning. So does Keynes; for the General Theory uses, on every 
page, standard economic reasoning. So do the rational expectationists, 
like Lucas and Sargent, and the monetarists, like Friedman. So do my 
predecessors in this volume. The allegiance of economists of all sects 
and descriptions to subjective expected utility maximization is hardly 
less unanimous than the allegiance of physicists to Newton's Three Laws 
of Motion in their relativised form.
Disagreement From Consensus
Now I appear to have hooked myself on a serious dilemma. If 
economists agree in the way I have just outlined, how can they disagree
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in the ways I described earlier? They can disagree because, in order 
to apply the standard core theory to real-world problems, that theory 
has to be augmented by additional assumptions, especially assumptions 
about what information people have, and how they deal with uncer 
tainty and with their own limited capacities for computation. Economists 
disagree about these auxiliary assumptions; and as a result of the 
disagreement, reach very different conclusions even though applying 
identical modes of reasoning. That is not surprising: conclusions de 
pend on premises. Using identical laws of logic, we will reach quite 
different conclusions about the visibility of swans in dim light from the 
premise "All swans are white" than from "All swans are black."
Let me provide an example of the sources of disagreement in 
economics from a central topic of macroeconomics: business cycle 
theory. The theory of static equilibrium under perfect competition 
developed by Arrow, Debreu, and others proves that, under equilibrium 
conditions, all resources will be fully employed: labor, capital, and so 
on. However, most (not all) economists concede that the real world 
is plagued by a fluctuating level of employment of both labor and pro 
duction facilities, with periods, from time to time, of substantial 
unemployment. How can we, within the framework of the accepted 
theory and method of reasoning, reconcile general equilibrium theory 
with the fact of unemployment and underemployment of resources. We 
can do it by making one small change in the assumptions of rationality  
by introducing one small grain of irrationality or nonrationality into 
behavior, and allowing that grain to grow into the pearl of unemploy 
ment of resources.
Keynes uses several mechanisms to produce this result; I will refer 
to just one of them. Starting with a standard classical model, he assumes 
that labor is not always quite rational, specifically, that in bargaining 
for wages, labor sometimes confuses the money wage, in current prices, 
with the real wage, adjusted for price changes. Labor is just a little 
stupid, and this stupidity draws the system away from full-employment 
equilibrium into a situation in which unemployment can appear and 
persist.
Lucas, a rational expectationist usually regarded as standing at the 
opposite end of the policy spectrum from Keynes, also admits that there
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is sometimes unemployment in the real world. He too starts out with 
a model of perfect rationality, which of course leads to full-employment 
equilibrium. He also introduces a grain of sand to displace that 
equilibrium and produce unemployment. His grain of sand consists in 
assuming that businessmen are not always quite rational, specifically, 
that they sometimes stupidly mistake a shift in the general price level for 
a change in relative prices in their own industry. This mistake (from lack 
of knowledge or ignorance in calculation) draws the system away from 
full-employment equilibrium into a state where there is unemployment.
So both Keynes and Lucas depart from the assumptions of perfect 
rationality in order to account for a fact of the real world, the fact of 
periodic unemployment. Both introduce a grain of irrationality in the 
form of a confusion between monetary and real prices what economists 
usually call "money illusion." In the case of Keynes, the liberal, the 
money illusion is suffered by labor; in the case of Lucas, the conser 
vative, it is suffered by businessmen. Presumably we know our friends 
better than we know strangers! Not only do they introduce irrationality 
in different ways, but they draw different conclusions, as a consequence, 
as to what policies should be followed to deal with the resulting 
unemployment.
In understanding the disagreement between Lucas and Keynes, it is 
important to remember where it comes from. It does not come from 
the central theory of rational economic behavior, on which they both 
agree, but from the auxiliary assumptions the grains of sand on which 
they disagree. That might lead us to ask where these auxiliary assump 
tions come from. They are empirical assumptions, assumptions about 
how particular groups of human beings behave in the real world, about 
what they know and don't know and how they use that knowledge or 
are affected by that ignorance. But you will search the pages of Keynes 
and Lucas vainly if you want to know the evidence from which these 
crucial premises are drawn. They are presented simply as "obvious" 
facts, as something "everyone knows." A dangerous procedure for a 
science that purports to give an account of the real world!
It is not only in business cycle theory that the auxiliary assumptions 
do all the work of deriving the conclusions. Here is an example drawn
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from microeconomics. In recent years, we have seen a kind of economic 
imperialism in which microeconomists seek to demonstrate that they 
can use the standard theory to explain not only strictly economic 
phenomena but the phenomena of politics, the family, and indeed of 
all of our social institutions as well. A vigorous and well-known leader 
of this intellectual imperialism is Gary Becker, of the University of 
Chicago; and James Buchanan also belongs to this school of thought, 
especially as it applies to political institutions.
Let us see how Becker, in his book on the family, deals with the 
observed fact that the employment of women has increased rapidly in 
recent years. Becker explains that this is due to the fact that the de 
mand curve for women employees has shifted upward during this same 
time more women will be employed at any wage, and hence wages 
will rise as more women are attracted from the home to the labor market. 
Becker cites no particular evidence for the shift in the demand curve, 
and indeed, it is not clear that during the period he is concerned with, 
the wages of women increased much more than the wages of men.
Moreover, there are alternative explanations we could consider. 
Perhaps the utility function of women has shifted, for example, as a 
consequence of consciousness raising, so that they prefer outside work 
to homework more than they did before. Or perhaps the productivity 
of homework has increased with the availability of household appliances, 
while the demand for it is relatively inelastic. All of these shifts would 
cause an increase in the number of women employed outside the home, 
and we are far from exhausting the list of possible explanations.
Again we see that the conclusion (which matches an observed fact) 
is not a consequence of the theory of rationality. The real work is done 
by the auxiliary assumptions, and without additional empirical evidence 
(which Becker does not bother to provide), we do not know which of 
the possible auxiliary assumptions is actually satisfied, and hence is caus 
ing the phenomenon. Without taking seriously the task of verifying the 
auxiliary assumptions empirically, we can find an "explanation" for 
any fact; our theory becomes tautological and vacuous. As Poincare 
once remarked about another theory: "An explanation was necessary, 
and was forthcoming; they always are; hypotheses are what we lack 
the least."
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In economics, hypotheses are certainly what we lack the least. Aux 
iliary hypotheses, frequently manufactured in the armchair, are in good 
supply. What is lacking is empirical evidence to test them. Why don't 
economists devote themselves more vigorously to testing their auxiliary 
hypotheses? I can only conjecture (the question is one that should also 
be settled by facts, historical and sociological facts about the economics 
profession).
First, there is a tradition of a priorism and deductivism in economics, 
which goes back at least to Adam Smith (although Smith was not reluctant 
to take facts where he could find them). It is more fun, and easier, to 
play with theory, especially mathematical theory, than to grub for facts. 
As long as the tradition persists in the profession, editors will accept 
analyses based on postulated facts or facts tested by casual empiricism.
Second, a few philosophers of economics, for example Boland, think 
that the standard theory is true by definition, and not empirically 
refutable. Friedman holds a related position, arguing that economic 
theory can only be tested by assessing the empirical correctness of its 
"predictions," and not by testing the correctness of its "assumptions." 
I have not the time here to argue the fallacies in these positions, which 
have been pointed out by numerous economists on other occasions. I 
mention these erroneous beliefs simply to account for the relative in 
difference of economists to empirical evidence.
Third, economists of course do carry out a very considerable amount 
of empirical work to test their theories, but they employ only a narrow 
range of methodologies in doing so. As a result, they spend much of 
their time viewing the world through the wrong end of a telescope, with 
correspondingly foggy results. By "the wrong end of a telescope" I 
mean that economists usually test their theories with the help of rather 
aggregated data about the economy which have mainly been gathered 
for practical purposes unconnected with economic theory and whose 
concepts and units bear only a faint resemblance to the concepts to which 
they are matched in the theory.
Robert Eisner has described these difficulties eloquently in his re 
cent presidential address to the American Economic Association, which
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appears as the lead article in the March 1989 American Economic Review, 
79:1-14. His summary (p. 11) displays the seriousness of his concerns:
I have . . . noted some pitfalls in using current and past 
variables in analyses that depend critically upon expectations 
of the future. I have warned of confusion in employing nar 
rowly defined measures of income and product in evaluating 
flows and trends in comprehensive earnings and output. I 
have argued that particularly large dangers abound in bas 
ing policy on conventional measures of private and public 
saving, investment and capital. I have suggested that usual 
estimates of some of the critical behavioral relations of 
macroeconomics may be suspect because of a failure to match 
theoretical constructs with appropriate empirical counterparts.
Very generally, I conclude, it is important in economics as 
elsewhere to know what we are talking about.
A very sophisticated body of econometric theory and methodology 
has been created since World War II to deal with the problem of carry 
ing out economic analyses with data that are too aggregated, measure 
the wrong concepts, are too infrequently collected, and are exceeding 
ly noisy. The experience of the past 50 years has shown that these 
sophisticated econometric tools do not compensate for the poor quality 
of the data to which they are applied.
Other kinds of data can of course be obtained; data that tell us 
something about the expectations, preferences, and choices of economic 
actors at micro levels. Opinion and attribute studies can be conducted 
(and of course have been). Actual decisionmaking processes can be 
observed in business organizations (and of course have been). But polling 
data and "case studies" of individual behavior are mistrusted in or 
thodox economic methodology. The use of these kinds of data to discover 
the realities of economic life and to provide an empirical basis for the 
auxiliary assumptions we need will require a revolution in methodological 
beliefs in economics, and a revolution in the training of economists, 
who are not now trained to use these techniques.
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Validity of the Standard Theory
If casual empiricism and the neglect of available sources of empirical 
evidence are a major scandal in contemporary economics, equally scan 
dalous is the retention of beliefs, central to the standard theory, that 
are empirically false. For when investigators have begun to examine, 
in field and laboratory, the central assumptions of the standard theory  
not just the auxiliary assumptions this time, but the very core of the 
theory it has turned out that these assumptions do not fit the facts.
For example, research in the 1950s, reported in The Behavioral Theory 
of the Firm and elsewhere, shows that business firms are not the sim 
ple profit-maximizing entities that the standard theory assumes them 
to be. They sometimes settle for "satisfactory" profits. They operate 
with slack that is only reduced under the pressure of hard times. They 
suffer from internal power struggles. They simply do not behave as 
required to meet the conditions of competitive equilibrium with effi 
cient use of resources.
Second, an increasing number of studies of experimental markets, 
operated under the controlled conditions of the laboratory, have shown 
that it is easy to construct market situations where behavior will depart 
widely from the predictions of the standard theory. Vernon Smith, 
Charles Plott, and others have shown that behavior tends to settle toward 
the predicted market equilibrium in simple markets, but that it is not 
at all difficult to produce booms and busts even under conditions where 
participants could easily compute the correct, rational behavior that 
would produce stability and equilibrium.
Third, a long series of studies by Allais, Kahneman, Tversky, and 
others have shown serious departures from utility-maximizing rationality 
when choices are made under conditions of uncertainty. Respondents, 
for example, opt much less frequently for a surgical operation where 
there is a 20 percent chance of dying than for an otherwise identically 
described operation where there is an 80 percent chance of living.
The sum and substance of these findings is that people just do not 
maximize utility. They do not have consistent utility functions (Allais). 
They do not reason correctly and consistently about probabilities and
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risks (Kahneman and Tversky). They use rules of thumb (heuristics) 
to simplify choice (Cyert and March). They look for satisfactory courses 
of action, they satisfice, instead of optimizing (Simon).
Nature is supposed to abhor vacuums, and the demonstration that a 
theory is empirically false, as the standard theory of economic choice 
most certainly is, appears to leave a large vacuum. Is there anything 
to fill it? Indeed there is. Over the past 30 years, cognitive psychology 
has developed a large body of empirically tested theory of decision- 
making and problemsolving. So far, economists have mostly ignored it.
The theory of decisionmaking to be found in psychology today 
substitutes satisficing for optimizing. It gives central position to the limits 
of human ability to deal with real-world complexity, and to the methods 
of radical approximation that are used to remove this mismatch of adap 
tive power to problem difficulty. Enlarging the scope of economic deci 
sion theory, it does not assume that the alternatives of choice are given 
a priori, but shows how they can be generated by selective (heuristic) 
search in problem spaces. It is beginning to investigate the processes 
that focus human attention on certain problems so that others are ig 
nored, and the processes of representing or framing problems in terms 
of their most important dimensions, omitting those that are less 
important.
The research that has produced the new theory has also produced new 
methodologies that are relevant for economic research. Methods have 
been devised to use computers to simulate complex human thought pro 
cesses and thereby to model problemsolving and decisionmaking situa 
tions of real-world complexity. The theory and practice of taking 
thinking-aloud protocols from human subjects while they are thinking 
and solving problems has been developed and explored.
Of course these developments do not mean that the problems of 
economics have been solved and that economists need merely to replace 
their standard theory with the new theory and apparatus. Certainly few 
of the economic implications of the new theory have been worked out. 
But a vacuum does not exist, and would not exist if the standard theory, 
or its invalid components, were simply abandoned. There is a firm foun 
dation on which economic research can proceed.
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What is to be Done?
I have described what I believe to be the serious problems facing 
economics and a path toward their solution. Both the auxiliary assump 
tions and the central postulates of classical economics must be revised 
on the basis of sound empirical evidence. To get the proper evidence, 
economists must receive new kinds of research training, much of it bor 
rowed from cognitive psychology and organization theory. Doctoral 
candidates must learn how to obtain data about beliefs, attitudes, and 
expectations. They must learn how to study decisionmaking processes 
inside and outside business organizations. They must learn how to 
analyze and interpret the verbal reports of human subjects in both 
laboratory and field situations. They must learn how to conduct 
laboratory experiments.
Increasing numbers of mainline economists are beginning to perceive 
and accept the need for these reforms. I have already mentioned some 
of them, and I could add many names to the list. But there is a long 
way to go.
The inability of economics today to play the policy role to which it 
aspires is a major source of pressure toward reform. The hubris of the 
1950s, when many economists thought we knew how to fine tune the 
economy, has disappeared in the face of stagflation and the ideological 
struggles between Keynesians and rational expectationists. Nevertheless, 
the reform will not be rapid.
As it progresses, however, the alteration of economics toward a 
responsible empiricism will gradually remove the present scandals in 
economic science: not just the public scandal of disarray in the policy 
arena, but the private scandal, known best to economists themselves, 
of a science that nearly renounced the practice of looking hard at the 
empirical evidence that was supposed to provide its foundations.
The late Tjalling Koopmans, a distinguished econometrician and a 
Nobel Laureate in economics, warned, in a celebrated book review 
against "measurement without theory." The remarks of Robert Eisner, 
quoted earlier, echo the same concern. The concern for economics that 
I have emphasized in my remarks is the complement of that one theory
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without measurement. What distinguishes science from every other form 
of human intellectual activity is that it disciplines speculation with facts. 
Theory and data are the two blades of the scissors. But the metaphor 
is not quite right, for the blades are not symmetric. When theories and 
facts are in conflict, the theories must yield. Economics has strayed 
from that simple principle, and it must return to it.
NOTE
1. I have only a newspaper reference to the original survey, which was conducted in Canada. 
I have repeated the finding by polling several audiences at my talks, but I must confess that when 
I tried to replicate the result during my talk in Kalamazoo, a majority of the noneconomists pres 
ent voted like economists Perhaps most of my audience had been taking economics courses from 
a very persuasive faculty
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